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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Search and Seizure
1. Standing
In United States v. Smith, I the Tenth Circuit refrained from
determining its position on an issue that had been specifically
reserved by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United
States,2 i.e., whether the holding in Simmons v. United States3
precludes a case by case analysis, rendering the "automatic
standing" rule of Jones v. United States unnecessary.4 Appellant
Smith, who had been convicted at a second trial of possession of
527 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1975).
411 U.S. 223 (1973). In order to have standing under Brown, defendants must (1)
be on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) allege a proprietary
or possessory interest in the premises; and (3) be charged with an offense which includes,
as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure. Id. at 229. As to the third criterion, the Supreme
Court stated: "But it is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in
Simmons . . . makes Jones 'automatic' standing unnecessary. We reserve that question
for a case where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential
element of the offense . . . charged.'" Id. at 228.
390 U.S. 377 (1968). The Supreme Court in Simmons held that concessions made
by a defendant in order to establish standing to move to suppress cannot be used by the
Government in its case-in-chief against him or her at trial. Id.
A 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones the Supreme Court held that in the case of a defendant
who had been convicted of possession of narcotics seized from the apartment of another
person, (1) the defendant need not make a preliminary showing of an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized and (2) because the defendant was lawfully in
the other person's apartment, he had made out a sufficient interest in the premises to
confer standing to contest the search. Id. at 263, 265. The Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975), expressed the
following view of "automatic standing":
Automatic standing ordinarily comes into play where the search has not
intruded upon the privacy of the defendant but where that which has been
seized nevertheless can be used against him. In such cases if he is to have
standing to object to the seizure as the product of an unreasonable search
he must show that some recognizable interest of his has been offended by
the seizure-a showing that prior to Jones was highly embarrassing.
510 F.2d at 37-38.
The Government in Smith, however, suggested "that under Brown there is no doubt
about the continued validity of the automatic standing rule of Jones." United States v.
Smith, 527 F.2d at 695.
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stolen United States Postal Service money orders, 5 sought on ap-
peal to establish his standing to challenge an automobile search
and subsequent seizure of the money orders. The record indicated
that Smith, while in the process of moving from his apartment,
threw a brown sack containing the money orders into the unoccu-
pied vehicle of a person who was helping him move.' Smith's
actions were observed by a police officer who subsequently
searched the unoccupied vehicle and seized the brown sack.'
In its analysis, the court reiterated the criteria articulated in
Jones v. United States' for standing to contest a search and sei-
zure, stating: "Jones . . . suggests three alternatives which may
be used to establish standing, (1) substantial proprietary or pos-
sessory interest in the thing seized, (2) a similar interest in the
premises searched, and (3) legitimate presence on the premises
searched." ' After determining that only the first criterion was
applicable,'" the court concluded that the evidence "clearly es-
tablishes that as of the time of the seizure Smith had abandoned
the money orders"" and, therefore, did not have a substantial
proprietary or possessory interest in the thing seized at the time
of the seizure. 2 In side-stepping the "automatic standing" issue
left open in Brown, ' 3 the Tenth Circuit pointed out the similarity
I Appellant's first conviction was reversed and remanded with directions that an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress be held prior to retrial. See United States
v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
527 F.2d at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
527 F.2d at 695.
" The record indicated that Smith was not in the unoccupied car when it was
searched nor did he have a possessory or proprietary interest in the helper's vehicle since
Palmasano, the helper, was a stranger to Smith. In addition, the court pointed out that
even if Smith had permission to put some of his belongings into Palmasano's car, he did
not do so. His belongings were placed in his own vehicle. Only the money orders were
"thrown" into Palmasano's vehicle. Id.
I Id. at 695-96. In disposing of the money orders, Smith testified that he "just wanted
them away from me." Id. at 695.
" Id. at 696.
" See notes 2 through 4 supra and accompanying text. Other circuit courts of appeal
have confronted the problem and avoided it in a number of ways. See United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1975) (possession at time of search not essential element of
crime charged); United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974) (possession not
essential element of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute); United States v.
Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1974) (even though defendants charged with possession as
an essential element of the offense charged, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence of posses-
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between Brown and its decision in Smith:
[Tihe Government's case against Smith does not depend upon
Smith's possession of the stolen money orders at the time such were
taken from [the helper's] automobile. As a matter of fact, the
"possession" relied on by the Government in the instant case to
support the conviction is necessarily "possession" occurring prior to
Smith's abandonment of the money orders, because a finding of
"abandonment" connotes a lack of possession." '
Thus, the court held that Smith was without standing be-
cause he had no proprietary or possessory interest in the money
orders at the time they were seized by the police. 5
2. Probable Cause for Warrantless Search
In United States v. Rodriguez6 the issue addressed by the
Tenth Circuit was whether border guards had probable cause to
search the luggage of passengers on a commercially operated van-
trailer combination passing over the border. Appellant Rodri-
guez, one of the paying passengers, was ordered from the van by
sion at the time of the contested search and seizure); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendants not charged with physical possession at the time of the
seizure); United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant in conspir-
acy prosecution not charged with possessory crime); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236
(6th Cir. 1974) (possession not an essential element of the conspiracy offense charged);
United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant never had actual or
constructive possession of his customers' suitcases at the time of the seizure). See also
United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 866-67 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975).
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Boston, framed the issue as follows:
What is left after Simmons to outrage one's sense of fairness-when there is
no intrusion upon a defendant's privacy and his claim of possessory right to
that which has been seized no longer has its devastating effect-is the matter
of "prosecutorial self-contradiction." The question is as to the degree and
quality of governmental inconsistency that suffice to create that condition
and, on balance, to trigger "automatic" standing. In such cases, as we read
Brown, it is not the facts as developed at trial or the prosecutor's theory of
guilt that controls. Rather, it is whether the defendant has been charged with
possession-whether possession is an essential element of the crime for which
he has been indicted.
510 F.2d at 38 (emphasis in original). See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.
1974).
1, 527 F.2d at 696.
ts Id. It should be noted that this analysis tends to eviscerate the "automatic stand-
ing" rule since a defendant charged with a possessory offense may arguably be said always
to have a "possessory interest" in the subject matter, regardless of whether he or she is in
actual physical control. This would afford such a defendant the "automatic standing" to
contest the seizure of the evidence alleged to be illegally possessed.
" 525 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1975).
1977
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border agents'7 and directed to open his luggage which had been
taken from the trailer hitched to the van.' He was subsequently
convicted of unlawful possession of heroin with the intent to dis-
tribute.'9
In determining that the discovery of marijuana in the trailer
was insufficient in and of itself to establish probable cause to
search the defendant's luggage, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the warrantless search in this instance violated the defendant's
fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.20 Although the Government contended that Rodriguez
"voluntarily" opened his suitcase,2 ' the court noted that the Gov-
ernment failed to sustain its burden in showing that consent had
been freely and voluntarily given for the warrantless search.2 The
court also resolved that the search could not be upheld as a search
incident to a lawful arrest.2 3 Finally, placing particular reliance
" Passengers, including Rodriguez, were ordered from the van after a border guard
located marijuana in the precise place where an informant had said it would be. Id. at
1315-16. Although there was a noted absence of prior dealings between the agent and this
particular informant, the court "assumed" that the agent had probable cause to believe
there was marijuana in the trailer since he had inquired of others who had had prior
dealings with this informant, thereby satisfying himself that the informant was reliable.
The court also made note of the fact that the border agent was not required to obtain a
warrant before searching the trailer for marijuana due to the automobile exception to the
search warrant requirement. Id. at 1316.
" Id. at 1315.
Rodriguez was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1316-17. Although Rodriguez' suitcase contained a large amount of
heroin (25 pounds), the court stated that "[s]uch fact, however, does not validate a
search that was invalid in its inception." Id. at 1315.
11 The court noted that the border patrol agents were armed and in full uniform and
that the passengers were ordered from the van and "told" to open their luggage. The mere
fact that Rodriguez, who understood little English, did so, does not mean that he voluntar-
ily consented to the search. Id. at 1315-16.
22 "[T]his burden is not met by merely showing acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority." Id. at 1316 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d
1189, 1191 (10th Cir. 1971).
" "The fact that marijuana was discovered in the trailer was not sufficient to justify
the arrest of Rodriguez for possession of marijuana." 525 F.2d at 1316. See United States
v. Castillo, 524 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1975). Castillo was the companion case to Rodriguez.
As driver of the van, Castillo was arrested for possession with intent to distribute the
marijuana found in the trailer. His conviction was subsequently overturned due to the fact
that he merely drove the van/trailer without having loaded or ever looked into the trailer.
Hence, the court determined he could not have been in possession.
The court in Rodriguez further noted that, even if the appellant had been subject to
a lawful arrest, "the scope of any permissible search incident to such arrest would not have
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on United States v. Di Re,2' the court concluded that the right to
search a vehicle for contraband does not carry with it a concomi-
tant right to search the person of an occupant of such vehicle and,
by extension, the occupant's suitcase.25
3. Airline Freight Inspections
The airline freight inspection 2 of a package shipped from
San Francisco, California, to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pre-
sented the Tenth Circuit with a question as to the reasonableness
of the search and seizure of the package's contents and the corol-
lary question of the protection afforded by the fourth amend-
ment, if any, where there is a private as opposed to a governmen-
tal search.2 In United States v. Ford21 an airline agent in San
Francisco opened a package addressed to the defendant in Okla-
homa City where the apparent nervousness of the sender alerted
the freight agent that the package might contain contraband or
another substance ineligible for air freight 20 After determining
extended to his suitcase in the trailer" since the presence of a weapon or the possibility
of destruction of the evidence by the arrestee and his proximity to his suitcase were not
present as to Rodriguez. 525 F.2d at 1316-17. The court further hypothesized that, even if
"Rodriguez' suitcase had merely been under his seat in the bus, instead of in the trailer,
it could not be said that there was probable cause to search Rodriguez' suitcase." Id. at
1317 (citing United States v. Day. 455 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Collins,
439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
2, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
1 525 F.2d at 1317. The Government relied on United States v. Medina-Flores, 477
F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1973), for the lawfulness of the search in Rodriguez. The Tenth Circuit,
however, distinguished the two cases on their facts, i.e., whether the driver and occupants
were total strangers, as in Rodriguez, or companions in crime, as in Medina-Flores. See
also United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 283 n.2 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955).
" The right of freight shippers to inspect all packages is established by tariffs filed
by carriers with the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970). See
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1309 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing ATP Tariff CAP No.
96, Rule 24). "The practical effect of [the tariff] is that the person shipping goods
consents to the inspection of his goods by entering into the contract of shipment." United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973).
27 The Tenth Circuit stated:
[We must] consider the validity of the search, arrest, and seizure process
in San Francisco and Oklahoma City. It seems to us that the events which
occurred in California and Oklahoma were one episode and must be consid-
ered together for Fourth Amendment purposes. Illegality in either place
would be fatal to the government's case.
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 1975).
See United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).




that the substance in the package was heroin, local police officers
called to the scene proceeded to mark, reseal, and place the pack-
age aboard the plane for Oklahoma City. Thereafter, enforcement
officers in that city were informed of the situation.3 ' Upon claim-
ing the package, the defendant was immediately arrested.2
Reiterating the language of United States v. Harding,3 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that "the events which occurred in San
Francisco did not amount to a government search; rather, it was
a private inspection .. .not violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. ,,34 In addition, the court determined that the seizure in San
1' Id. at 1309-10.
32 Ford was charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). On appeal, the
defendant-appellant invoked her fourth amendment protection as to the contents of the
package. 525 F.2d at 1310.
475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. ), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 964 (1973). The Tenth
Circuit, in Harding, held that the inspection was authorized by tariff regulations and was
thus a private search in the absence of "collusion with federal officers." 475 F.2d at 483.
See 5 L. ORFLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 41:25 (1967).
m 525 F.2d at 1312. All of the cases relied upon by the Tenth Circuit to support its
position seem to have entailed the following general fact pattern: Airline officials become
suspicious as to the contents of a package because of the demeanor of the sender or because
of the contents marked on the package; the package is opened by the airline agents who
determine that the package contains a suspicious narcotic substance or obscene materials;
and law enforcement officers, either local or federal, are then called to verify the contents
before the package is resealed. United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v. Harding, 475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1973).
The threshold question facing the Tenth Circuit, in determining whether information
obtained as a result of an airline freight inspection is usable by the Federal Government
at trial, is whether or not the Government participated in the initial search. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975), wherein the test appeared to be whether the
"initial opening of one of the trunks [was] by the freight agent." 508 F.2d at 994. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that the focus of inquiry should
be on whether the airline search was "made on the carrier's own initiative for its own
purposes." United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at 398. The Tenth Circuit noted, in Ford,
that "[iun our case, as in Pryba and apparently in Issod, the government agents were
called in after completion of a privately motivated and authorized inspection by airline
officials .... " 525 F.2d at 1312.
Other cases have held that "an inspection by a carrier is not a governmental search.
United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972)." United States v. DeBerry, 487
F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1973). See United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); United
States v. Tripp, 468 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973); Clayton
v. United States, 413 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). If the
search is conducted in the presence of or at the behest of government law enforcement
officers, then the evidence obtained may be inadmissible unless probable cause for the
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Francisco was reasonable and necessary where based upon proba-
ble cause under exigent circumstances. 5 Following the analysis of
the Second Circuit in United States v. DeBerry,31 the Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Oklahoma City officers were merely
reasserting dominion and control over the package and its con-
tents as part of one continuous episode and that the constitu-
tional rights of the appellant had not been violated thereby. 7
B. Arrest Without Probable Cause and Effect Upon Confession
The Tenth Circuit was confronted with a case "at the cross-
roads of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments"" in Stevens v.
Wilson.3" Appellant Stevens sought appeal from a judgment of
the federal district court which had denied habeas corpus relief
from a conviction affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court.40
Appellant Stevens "alleged that her arrest was unlawful and that
it tainted her subsequent confession since the confession was the
product of the invalid arrest . . . ."" The Tenth Circuit noted
search is present. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). For other cases
supporting this proposition see authorities cited in United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at
398 n.41. See also United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 525 F.2d at 1313. It appears that the Tenth Circuit went one step beyond DeBerry
(no warrant required at the suitcase's destination) in that it required exigent circumstan-
ces where there was no search warrant at the package's place of dispatch, i.e., San Fran-
cisco. The court pointed out that if the officers had detained the substance until a magis-
trate could issue a warrant to seize it: "The time delay required to obtain a warrant...
might very well have warned the parties to the crime of the government's presence and
prevented their apprehension. If the contraband had not been shipped immediately, the
Oklahoma City addressee probably would have become suspicious and remained aloof."
Id.
36 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
37 525 F.2d at 1312-13. Under the DeBerry analysis, the seizure of the contraband by
a Los Angeles officer was legal where the carrier, under a legal inspection, put the mari-
juana in the officer's plain view; the marijuana could then be seized upon sight without a
warrant. The officer was deemed to have made the seizure by removing one of the bricks
of marijuana, marking it, and marking its container with his initials. Thus, when police
in New York removed the bag from the back seat of the defendants' car, they were not
making an initial seizure, but were merely reasserting dominion and control first exercised
by the government in Los Angeles over the suitcase. United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d
at 451.
31 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975).
- 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0 People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973). The appellant was convicted
in the state court of possession of marijuana, in violation of CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 48-5-2
(1963), and of introducing contraband into the Colorado State Penitentiary, in violation
of CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-7-58(2) (Supp. 1967).
" 534 F.2d at 869.
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the chain of events leading up to the challenged confession to be
as follows: Stevens entered a restroom on the grounds of the Colo-
rado State Penitentiary; the restroom was searched after her exit
and marijuana was subsequently found; she and a companion
followed an investigator, at his request, to a room in the maxi-
mum security area where they were arrested and given their
rights under Miranda v. Arizona;42 and she was detained in the
room for interrogation during which time she made an inculpa-
tory statement.
4 3
The Tenth Circuit was in accord with the district court ruling
that Stevens' arrest was not a mere detention or preliminary in-
vestigation within the framework of Terry v. Ohio." However,
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,' 534 F.2d at 869-70. The Tenth Circuit referred to the opinion of the Colorado
Supreme Court for this summary of the essential facts.
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In accordance with its reasoning in Stone v. People, 174 Colo.
504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction on
the ground that the alleged arrest was in the nature of a field investigation. In Stone such
detention was justified by something less than probable cause. Id. See People v. Stevens,
183 Colo. at 404, 517 P.2d at 1339. Thus, the supreme court concluded that removal of
petitioner from the prison lobby was a reasonable and sensible manner in which to investi-
gate criminal activity, and that a one-half hour detention for the same was reasonable
under the circumstances. Id. at 406-07, 517 P.2d at 1340. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
34-35 (White, J., concurring) (favors temporary detention on streets if pertinent questions
are asked). See also People v. DeBour, 19 Cmia. L. REp. (BNA) 2289 (N.Y. Ct. App., June
15, 1976), wherein the court held that an officer with a lesser degree of suspicion than that
necessary for a forcible stop under Terry may approach a private citizen on the street for
the purpose of requesting information; however, the officer must have an articulable
reason for doing so. It should also be noted that the Colorado Supreme Court in Stevens
pointed out that the record before it would not support the extent of an intrusion which
would be justified by probable cause to arrest. 183 Colo. at 406, 517 P.2d at 1340.
The federal district court disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion
that the "arrest" was within Terry, ruling instead that there had been an arrest for the
purpose of interrogating Stevens. Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d at 870. The Tenth Circuit
agreed that the appellant's arrest was not a detention or preliminary investigation due to
the fact that "the appellant was confined within a room in the penitentiary; ...she was
confronted with the marijuana which had been discovered in the restroom following her
visit; .. . she was questioned thoroughly and a confession was obtained." Id. Judge
Barrett, in his concurring opinion, preferred to premise the finding that there had been
an arrest on the fact that the defendant had been told she was under arrest. Id. at 873.
Note the hypothetical effect of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), on Stevens'
habeas corpus claim in Stevens v. Wilson. In Stone the United States Supreme Court held
that, after a defendant has been afforded an opportunity for the full and fair litigation of
fourth amendment claims by the state, he may not thereafter obtain federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that illegally seized evidence was introduced at his trial. 428 U.S. at
494. It would appear that Stevens presents just the type of case where the appellant should
not be afforded habeas corpus relief since she raised the issue of no probable cause for
the arrest at the state level. 183 Colo. at 403, 517 P.2d at 1338.
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given the fact that there was an arrest, the court concluded that
the federal district court had failed to consider whether there was
probable cause to arrest based upon the seizure of the mari-
juana.' 5 In remanding for findings on this issue, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the presence or absence of probable cause was a
crucial question in the case'" and concluded "that the trial court
erred in merely determining the voluntariness of the confession
as a Fifth Amendment problem in failing to come to grips with
the illegality of the arrest and its effect upon the validity and
competency of the appellant's confession."' 7
The Tenth Circuit further instructed that if it was found that
an arrest had been made without probable cause,' 8 then the valid-
ity and competency of the confession would have to be considered
in light of Wong Sun v. United States" and Brown v. Illinois.2
11 The court stated that an independent determination of whether probable cause
existed for the arrest pursuant to the fourth amendment is "the crucial issue in a habeas
corpus case" and "entirely permissible and ... called for under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254."
534 F.2d at 870.
" Id. at 871. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) [A] determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made
by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . , shall be presumed to be
correct, unless. . . that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual
determination, is produced. . . and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record.
, 534 F.2d at 872. The federal district court had concluded that a violation of the
appellant's fourth amendment rights was not a controlling consideration since voluntari-
ness of the confession was the crucial issue of the case and, under standards set by the
Tenth Circuit, the confession had been voluntary. Id. at 870 n.1.
" The court noted that "[clonceivably the total evidence amounted to probable
cause [to arrest]" but that "the issue would be at least a close question demanding
careful scrutiny" by the trier of fact. Id. at 871. For additional cases dealing with the
necessity of determining probable cause to arrest prior to determining the voluntariness
of confessions, see United States v. Rose, 526 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 905 (1976); Logan v. Capps, 525 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Burnett, 526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1976).
, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
422 U.S. 590 (1975). The Tenth Circuit does not view Brown as extending or enlarg-
ing Wong Sun but merely views it as a recognition by Illinois of the Wong Sun doctrine.
534 F.2d at 872. See United States ex rel. Mungo v. LaVallee, 522 F.2d 211, 218 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1975). For this reason, the Tenth Circuit found the state's argument that Brown was
to be applied retroactively as nonmeritorious. 534 F.2d at 872 n.3. In its analysis, the
Tenth Circuit noted certain criteria from Brown for determining whether a confession was
the fruit of an illegal arrest, e.g., whether Miranda warnings had been given; or the
1977
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On the other hand, if the federal district court concluded that the
arrest was valid, then the criteria of Miranda v. Arizona would
have to be examined to determine whether or not the confession
had been voluntary.5
II. FwrH AMENDMENT
A. Grand Jury Setting
1. Use of Privileges
In Thompson v. United States52 witness Thompson, as secre-
tary and representative of the Phillips Petroleum Co., asserted
the attorney-client and work-product privileges as defenses to a
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)53 contempt citation for failure to produce
certain corporate documents subpoenaed by a grand jury. At the
request of the Government, and in response to appellant's motion
to quash, the trial court examined the disputed documents54 in
camera. After conducting an ex parte hearing at which govern-
ment counsel was present, the court held that the Government
had met its burden in establishing a prima facie need for the
documents.5 5 On appeal, Thompson challenged the ex parte hear-
ing, asserting that a determination as to whether the documents
contained communications in contemplation or furtherance of
illegal activities required an adversary hearing."
presence of intervening circumstances. Id. at 872. See Santos v. Bayley, 400 F. Supp. 784,
789 (D.C. Pa. 1975) (held that the confession was an intervening independent act of free
will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest). The court also reiterated
that the burden of showing admissibility of a confession after an illegal arrest (that it was
the product of an accused's free will) rests upon the State. 534 F.2d at 872. See United
States v. Shavers, 524 F.2d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1975).
11 534 F.2d at 871.
52 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976).
This subsection reads as follows:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court
or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including
any book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court,
upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may
summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the
witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (emphasis added).
11 The Tenth Circuit also examined all of the disputed documents in camera and
determined that 28 of them involved the claims of attorney-client privilege and 7 made
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In rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit began with the
proposition that Thompson's attorney-client privilege was gov-
erned by common law.57 The court then noted that previous deci-
sions interpreting the privilege had held that the privilege must
give way when illegal activities on the part of the client are in-
volved. 5 Recognizing that this determination of existing or in-
tended criminal activity can be made during an ex parte hear-
ing,59 the court determined that the burden of demonstrating
some relationship between the subpoenaed documents and the
charges under investigation rests upon the Government. 0 The
Tenth Circuit then concluded that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in conducting an ex parte hearing and that the
Government had met its burden in showing prima facie need.6'
As to Thompson's claimed work-product privilege, the court
followed the Hickman v. Taylor2 rule and the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Natta v. Hogan. 13 In light of these decisions, the court
was resolved to find that, in the absence of a claim by the appel-
lant that the documents had been prepared for pending litigation,
the Government had met its burden in showing "adequate rea-
son" for the production of the documents. 4 The Tenth Circuit
further stated that "[t]he question of the work-product privilege
5 Id. at 736-37. See FEn. R. EvID. 501.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'd 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); United States v. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1955).
11 On the basis of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Thompson argued
that an adversary hearing was required. In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
those cases where an adversary hearing is required due to the witness' claimed defense of
illegal electronic surveillance by the government and the instant case where there is a
noted absence of such a defense. 532 F.2d at 737. See United States v. Vigil, 524 F.2d 209
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 927 (1976). The court expressed the concern that
to allow an adversary hearing on Thompson's claimed privilege would turn the hearing
into a mini-trial on the merits and subvert the expeditious functioning of the grand jury.
532 F.2d at 737.
532 F.2d at 737.
I Id. at 738. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d at 1086. See also Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. at 14.
62 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The rule states that the proponent seeking an attorney's
documents must establish "adequate reasons" to justify production. Id. at 512.
392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968) (discovery does not apply to documents prepared
by an attorney in preparation for impending litigation).
1 532 F.2d at 738.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
is one for ultimate determination at the trial. We will not give an
anticipatory answer."'
In the case of In re Vigil," witness Vigil contended that her
marriage to a prospective defendant in a case under investigation
by the grand jury constituted "just cause" under 28 U.S.C. §
1826(a)"7 for her refusal to testify before the grand jury.1
8 Vigil
was served with a subpoena on July 22, 1975, directing her to
appear before the grand jury on August 19, 1975. On August 18,
1975, defense counsel filed various motions, memoranda, and affi-
davits, none of which sought to raise the marital relationship
privilege as a defense.69 On the following day a hearing was held
on Vigil's motions to quash the subpoena. After the denial of each
motion, she appeared before the grand jury and refused to tes-
tify.70 She was subsequently granted "use" immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 60021' and was ordered by the trial court to testify.72 On
the afternoon of August 19th Vigil again refused to testify, for the
first time mentioning her alleged marital relationship as one
ground for her refusal.73 Although the Government made a re-
0Id.
524 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1975).
,7 See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
* 524 F.2d at 217.
" Id. The court's decision indicates that these motions raised such issues as grand
jury selection, Vigil's right to have an attorney present in the grand jury room, and her
right to compel disclosure of electronic surveillance. Id. at 212. See notes 82 through 99
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the electronic surveillance defense to
contempt proceedings.
7o 524 F.2d at 212.
An example of "use" immunity in this case would be to prohibit the use of any
specific answer she gave before the grand jury from being used against her in a subsequent
prosecution. However, it does not prohibit the use of evidence discovered from leads
supplied by that testimony.
11 254 F.2d at 217. As an additional ground for appeal, the appellant claimed that
the immunity granted was not broad enough. Id. at 219. Following the Supreme Court
decision in Kastizar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court did not err in refusing to issue protective orders. But see Justice Douglas'
dissent in Kastizar:
When we allow the prosecution to offer only "use" immunity we allow
it to grant far less than it has taken away. For while the precise testimony
that is compelled may not be used, leads from that testimony may be pur-
sued and used to convict the witness. My view is that the framers put it
beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes.
Id. at 466-67. For a recent criticism of "use" immunity and the grand jury system in
general, see Goldenberg, Congressional Reform of Grand Juries Expected, Rocky Moun-
tain News, November 15, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and at 14, col. 2.
71 524 F.2d at 217.
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quest that Vigil be held in contempt after her second refusal to
testify on August 19th, the trial court continued the matter until
August 22, 1975, in order to give Vigil another opportunity to
answer those questions for which she had been granted immun-
ity.74 Appellant appeared before the grand jury on August 22nd
and again refused to answer questions, asserting as one ground
the husband-wife privilege. Another hearing was held at which
time the trial court adjudged Vigil "to be in civil contempt" and
ordered her confinement until she complied with the orders of the
court .
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits of Vigil's claim
of a marital privilege," disposing of the issue on the ground that
it was not timely raised.77 In addition, the court determined that
the appellant's affidavit78 in support of the privilege was not
timely filed with the trial court. 9 In view of this failure to comply
with procedural requirements, the Tenth Circuit held that an
" The court's opinion indicates that 14 written questions were submitted to Vigil at
her first grand jury appearance. Id. at 212. It further indicates, without explanation as to
the contents, that Vigil was granted use immunity as to three questions. Id. at 217. When
the trial court continued the proceeding until August 22, 1975, it "broadened the immun-
ity order to include additional questions." Id. Throughout the entire proceeding it appears
that Vigil steadfastly refused to answer any question other than her name. Id. at 212 n.1.
Id. at 217-18.
7 The court gave some indication that it questioned whether the marital relationship
had been alleged in good faith, citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
Appellant Vigil relied on In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974), to support her
claimed marital privilege. The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished Snoonian on its facts
since the "husband-wife relationship was not in dispute and the court reached the merits
of the claimed privilege." 524 F.2d at 218.
" As indicated, Vigil first raised the husband-wife privilege at her first appearance
before the grand jury after pre-appearance hearings on her motions to quash the subpoena.
See text accompanying note 73 supra. The Tenth Circuit spoke of "the rather tardy
manner in which the marital relationship issue was sought to be injected into the proceed-
ing." 524 F.2d at 218.
The appellant's affidavit read as follows:
I, VERONICA VIGIL being duly sworn, depose and say that I am the wife
of Ray Otero. Ray and I began to live together in Boulder, Colorado in
October, 1973. In December, 1973, we became man and wife by mutual
consent in Boulder, Colorado. We continued to live together until April,
1975. I believe Ray Otero to be the target of the Grand Jury investigation.
Id.
79 Appellant's August 22nd hearing occurred at 11:00 a.m., at which time her counsel
sought to file an affidavit of "Veronica Vigil re her Marriage." This affidavit was not given
to the trial judge before or during the contempt hearing but was apparently filed with the
clerk of court at 2:54 p.m. on August 22, 1975. Id. at 217.
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evidentiary hearing on the marital relationship was not required
by the trial court.80 Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that Vigil's unsupported assertion of her marriage to a
prospective defendant was not "just cause" for her refusal to
testify before the grand jury.8
2. Illegal Electronic Surveillance
In support of her refusal to answer questions propounded by
the Government before the grand jury, Veronica Vigil further
alleged illegal electronic surveillance as a "just cause" under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a).82 She claimed that the Government's denial of
such electronic surveillance was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. §
3504(a)(1) to sustain its position.83 In affirming the lower court,
the Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Gelbard v. United States.4 In Gelbard
the Court held that if there has been prior illegal electronic sur-
veillance and it can be shown that the interrogation of the witness
before a grand jury would be based upon such illegal interception,
then just cause not to answer exists under section 1826(a).1 The
Tenth Circuit then bifurcated its analysis, discussing issues
" By analogy to an untimely claim of illegal electronic surveillance in In re Lewis,
501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975), the Tenth Circuit concluded
that "the late filing of a bare claim of common-law marriage should not be permitted to
impede the work of the Grand Jury." 524 F.2d at 218.
524 F.2d at 218.
See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
3 This section provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority
of the United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was ob-
tained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall
affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.
18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
The evidentiary prohibition found in Gelbard is premised on the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 prohibits the presentation to grand juries of the compelled testimony of a witness
which was intercepted in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 408 U.S. at 47. In a subsequent case
the Supreme Court narrowed the application of Gelbard, stating that the Court's conclu-
sion rested exclusively on its interpretation of Title 1I, i.e., that it was simply an effort
by Congress to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by the misuse
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 n.ll
(1974).
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which were not considered by the Supreme Court in Gelbard:s1 (1)
The sufficiency of the witness' claim of illegal surveillance which
will trigger an evidentiary hearing on the existence or absence of
surveillance, 87 and (2) the sufficiency of the Government's denial
of surveillance under section 3504(a)(1)."'
As to the claim of electronic surveillance, counsel for Vigil
filed one affidavit by the appellant personally89 and two by her
counsel. 0 The court concluded that the information contained in
Vigil's affidavits were "grossly lacking" and, thus, insufficient to
establish the existence of electronic surveillance.9 The Tenth Cir-
cuit expressed the opinion that the affidavits did "no more than
describe the ordinary experiences which are encountered by the
telephone user from time to time in his daily life.
'9 2
Although the appellant's evidence of illegal surveillance was
insubstantial, the court focused on the sufficiency of the Govern-
524 F.2d at 213.
" The Supreme Court, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969), held
that an adversary hearing was required in order to determine if evidence supporting
defendant's convictions was the product of an illegal electronic surveillance.
See also United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court held
that the witness' affidavits were sufficiently concrete and specific to make a prima facie
showing of electronic surveillance which shifted the burden to the Government to affirm
or deny under 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1). See also United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709
(2d Cir. 1973), where the court interpreted the language of § 1826(a), "without just cause
shown," to place on the witness the burden of coming forward with "just cause." But see
notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
0 See note 83 supra.
"' From her analysis of the questions asked at her first appearance before the grand
jury, appellant stated "her belief" that the questions were "directly or indirectly" based
upon illegal electronic surveillance. 524 F.2d at 214.
90 Id. The affidavits of appellant's counsel set forth general difficulties with Vigil's
phone, e.g., inability to get connections, substantial delay before the connection was
made, problems in dialing, a "double beep," and a "hollow sound" when there was rapid
dialing. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543, 550 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
524 F.2d at 214.
92 Id. See also In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 550; United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d at
1024-25; In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1972).
As to the affidavits filed by appellant's counsel in Vigil, neither appellant nor the
court squarely raised the issue of whether electronic surveillance of third parties conceiva-
bly could have been the basis for any of the questions propounded. See United States v.
Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1973), where the Government did not specifically re-
spond to the allegation that the attorney had been subjected to surveillance. See also
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975);
United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466,
468 (1st Cir. 1971).
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ment's denial, i.e., how far must the Government search for evi-
dence of illegal surveillance93 and what quality of evidence is
necessary to support the denial?9' The trial court heard testimony
from the two law enforcement officers conducting the investiga-
tion of the case, both of whom testified that there was no elec-
tronic surveillance. 5 In addition, the trial court was advised by
an Assistant United States Attorney that he had been assured by
11 The First Circuit has stated that "Itihe dominate [sic] weight of authority has
rejected a conclusory statement as an appropriate response [by the government]." In re
Hodges, 524 F.2d 568, 570 nn.1-5 (1st Cir. 1975). See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 806
(1st Cir. 1974). But see In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1974), as interpreted by the
First Circuit in In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570 n.6. Other courts have taken the approach
that the Government's response may match the claim of surveillance, e.g., a general denial
in response to nonspecific allegations. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d
1257 (9th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973). Still other
circuit courts have required some search of the relevant government agencies which may
be involved in the investigation, differing only in the number of agencies which should be
checked. In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77, 79
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585, 602 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170,
1173 n.10 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d 1193, 1194 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Womack, 466 F.2d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 469 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972);
In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 120 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971). See Judge Okes' dissent in United
States v. Grusse, 515 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975), where he would require the so-called
eight agency search of the FBI; Secret Service; IRS; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms; Customs; DEA; and Postal Service.
'" Some circuit courts have required that evidence of the search be in affidavit form
submitted by those government agencies which have searched or by those government
officials in charge of the investigation. In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 549; In re Millow, 529
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Grusse, 515 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring); In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1973); Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d
1193 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1972). See also In re Grumbles,
453 F.2d at 120 n.4. Other courts have found letters of a search acceptable. United States
v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Womack, 466 F.2d
555 (7th Cir. 1972). And some courts have stressed the importance of oral testimony, under
oath, as acceptable evidence of the search. In re Jurney, 410 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971). See note 95 infra and accompanying
text. But see United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grumbles, 453
F.2d at 120 n.4. The First Circuit sidesteps what it considers to be the minimum standard
for an adequate government response under § 3504 because "the necessary facts and
circumstances are not presented [in the instant case]." In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570.
" In re Vigil, 524 F.2d at 215.
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''every agency of the United States which had had anything to do
with the case . . . that there had not been any electronic surveil-
lance either by court order or otherwise to the best of their knowl-
edge.""6 In holding that such denial by the Government satisfies
the requirements of section 3504(a), the court expressed its pref-
erence for testimony in court as opposed to denial by affidavit. 7
The court further stated its preference for the balancing approach
in determining the sufficiency of the Government's denial98 and
noted that its approach "is in harmony with that employed in the
other cases." 99
B. Trial Setting
In United States v. Smith"0 the appellant challenged his two
convictions for criminal contempt which had arisen out of his
refusal to testify in successive criminal trials. His argument was
twofold: (1) That the proceedings granting him immunity were
defective, 0' and (2) that the second contempt charge subjected
g1 Id. The Tenth Circuit stressed the fact that the Assistant United States Attorney
"also has assured this court that there has been no electronic surveillance." Id. (emphasis
in original).
7 Id. at 216.
Id. The court rejected Vigil's reliance on United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1973), where the Ninth Circuit held the Government to greater specificity in what
agencies were elected and what was the substance of their responses. Id. at 1027. Instead
the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]e consider a quest for certainty in this kind of inquiry
futile and regard a balancing or weighing evaluation to be more helpful because each case
presents individual demands." 524 F.2d at 216. Although the Tenth Circuit was not
specific as to what was to be balanced or weighed, it would appear from the above that
the court was referring to the facts presented by each particular case. Other courts have
spoken of the balancing test in terms of weighing the right of the witness to be free from
unwarranted surveillance against the right of the Government to operate grand juries in
an effective manner. See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975);
Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d at 752 (5th Cir. 1972).
534 F.2d at 216-17, 220-22.
00 532 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1976).
101 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) provides that:
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under sub-section (a) . . .when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
Appellant argued that it was error for the First Assistant United States Attorney to
sign the application for an immunity order under § 6003. He further argued that the trial
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him to double jeopardy.'"2
Smith had been granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6003103
as the result of his claimed privilege against self-incrimination
when he refused to testify at the first bank robbery trial.'0 4 A
mistrial was subsequently granted when Smith persisted in his
refusal to testify despite this grant of immunity. In addition, the
prosecution commented upon Smith's prospective testimony in
its opening statement.' 5 At the second trial on the bank robbery,
Smith again refused to testify when called as a witness. This
resulted in the reinstatement of his grant of immunity. His per-
sistence in refusing to testify gave rise to the charges of and sub-
sequent convictions on the two counts of criminal contempt now
challenged. '
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "there is no merit what-
soever to the contention that 18 U.S.C. Section 6003 was not
complied with," since the United States Attorney may designate
any assistant to carry out his or her functions under section
6003.07 In addition, the court pointed out that the authorization
under section 6003 covered both of Smith's refusals to testify,
stating: "It is unreasonable to compel the Justice Department to
apply for immunity with a related review of the record each time
a problem of this kind comes up. To so hold would be to approve
court erred in accepting the general application and order granting immunity for the first
trial insofar as applying it to the second effort to obtain the appellant's testimony. 532
F.2d at 160. Following the authorization for immunity under § 6003, counsel was ap-
pointed for Smith when he claimed a lack of understanding of immunity. Although it is
unclear whether this appointment of counsel occurred before or after the immunity hear-
ing, the absence of counsel at the time immunity is granted is not a deprivation of any
constitutional right. United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973). In addition,
the witness must demonstrate some prejudice caused by the absence of counsel at the
immunity hearing. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
0 532 F.2d at 160-61. Smith argued that he could be convicted of only one offense of
criminal contempt, citing the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
"1 See note 101 supra for the language of 18 U.S.C. § 6003. See also 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1970) which provides as follows:
[Tihe witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order . . . may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.
532 F.2d at 159.
105 Id.
10 The trial court brought contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
,01 532 F.2d at 160. See note 101 supra.
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legal maneuvering by an accused. This we refuse to do."' 8 The
court then determined that Smith's two convictions were not dou-
ble jeopardy' 9 since they were distinct and successive acts of
contempt punishable as separate offenses." '0 The court also took
note that Smith was not prejudiced due to the fact that he re-
ceived identical concurrent sentences."' Expressing the courts'
general disfavor for multiplying contempt penalties where a de-
fendant has made his or her position clear,"' the court concluded
that the case did not evidence an attempt to multiply offenses
since the Government had reason to believe that Smith would
testify the second time and was therefore justified in calling him
a second time."3
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v.
California"' required extensive interpretation by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in the past year. In Faretta it was determined that a defen-
dant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right under the
sixth amendment"5 to proceed without counsel when he or she
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." 6 An analogous issue
arose in United States v. Hill"7 and United States v. Bennett"'
as to whether a defendant charged with a federal crime has a
532 F.2d at 160 (citing In re Weir, 520 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1975)).
,o0 "Double jeopardy is a defense which, since it seeks to bar a second prosecution, is
ordinarily raised prior to trial." 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed.
1970).
"1 532 F.2d at 160, and cases cited therein. See also Lufman v. United States, 500
F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
"1 532 F.2d at 160-61, and cases cited therein. See United States v. Abigando, 439
F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1971).
,,1 532 F.2d at 161, and cases cited therein. See People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166
N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed. 1970). The First Circuit uses a "single subject" test to
determine if the prosecution is attempting to multiply offenses. The court, however, noted
problems with the test because it may be too open-ended, i.e., there are infinite ways to
categorize information in terms of time, place, incident, transaction, and people involved.
See Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 390 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972).
"1 532 F.2d at 161.
" 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The Supreme Court held: "Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so
many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is
• . . necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment." Id. at 819.
" Id. at 834-35.
117 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976).
"1 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976).
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statutory"9 and/or constitutional right ° to represent him or her-
self with the assistance of counsel.'
2'
In United States v. Hill the defendant moved by both written
and oral motion to ask questions of jurors and witnesses at trial
while at the same time taking advantage of the assistance of
counsel. 1 2 The trial court denied both motions and the
defendant-appellant appealed, claiming that his right to repre-
sent himself had been denied.
2 3
Surveying the pre-Faretta decisions of other circuit courts of
appeal,2 4 the Tenth Circuit noted a trend indicating that a person
could either represent himself or be represented by counsel. How-
ever, a person does not have a right to hybrid representation.
5
I' 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) (emphasis added) provides: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein."
l2 See note 115 supra.
121 526 F.2d at 1024; 539 F.2d at 49. The argument advanced in Bennett proposed that
the right of self-representation under § 1654, the sixth amendment, and Faretta sustains
a defendant's right to hybrid representation, i.e., self-representation with the aid of coun-
sel. Id.
"1 The court's opinion contains the following colloquy between the trial court and
Hill:
THE DEFENDANT: Well, at this point, I would ask if-again I could be
allowed to assist in my defense.
THE COURT: You mean ask questions of jurors and ask questions of
witnesses?
THE DEFENDANT: To a certain extent, yes.
THE COURT: No. The Court is not going to grant you that request. I have
already ruled on it.
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, I didn't say that I wanted to dismiss them
[his attorney]. I said that I wanted to represent myself and I want to have
my attorneys assist me.
526 F.2d at 1024 n.3.
"I Id. at 1024. The record indicates that prior to the noon recess, defendant addressed
the court with reference to the absence of blacks on the jury. "[His] statements .. .
deteriorated to the point that defendant was finally physically removed from the court-
room." Id. at 1023. After the noon recess, and out of hearing by the jury, defendant again
addressed the court and requested permission to question jurors and witnesses. Id. It was
appellant's position that the court should have inquired to determine the exact nature of
his claim. Id. at 1024.
21 526 F.2d at 1024, and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d
82, 86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964); Manson v. Pitchess, 317 F. Supp. 816 (C.D. Cal. 1970). But see
Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974).
"1 526 F.2d at 1024.
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The court then determined that Faretta did not alter the estab-
lished rules concerning hybrid representation, 2 ' taking cogniz-
ance of the fact that the sixth amendment fails to address hybrid
representation as a right of constitutional dimensions.'2 Concom-
itantly, the court suggested that there is not any statutory right
of such representation since 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is written in the
disjunctive. 8 After concluding that Hill's request was in fact for
hybrid representation, the Tenth Circuit held there was no abuse
of discretion in the denial of his motions. 12
The defendant, in United States v. Bennett, 130 was convicted
in a first trial 131 of one count of forcibly interfering with a prison
hospital administrator in the performance of his duties. 32 During
a hearing on a pretrial motion, Bennett requested that he be able
to assist in his own defense by making the opening and closing
statements to the jury and by cross-examining particular govern-
ment witnesses. 33 The trial court ruled that Bennett could cross-
"' Id. The court cites to a post-Faretta decision, United States v. Swinton, 400 F.
Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), wherein it was held that a criminal defendant has no sixth
amendment right to act as her own counsel where she is also represented by an attorney.
See United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); Stiner v. Oklahoma, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). See also United
States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
It can be argued that Swinton seems to require some showing on the part of a defen-
dant seeking co-counsel status that his or her traditional representation is inadequate or
inappropriate. The defendant's allegations that she should take "personal responsibility
for the conduct of a trial whose outcome may seriously affect her life for many years";
that "citizens should participate in social institutions"; and that her cross-examination
of former associates would be more effective than that of her attorney were apparently
not sufficient. United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 807. The court stated that the
defendant was represented by "able counsel who have had ample experience and a thor-
ough acquaintance with the matters in litigation." Id.
'7 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See note 119 supra.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d at 49; United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
The court in Swinton gave some indication of the test to be used by trial judges in
determining whether or not to allow a defendant to proceed pro se: a "balancing [ofn
considerations of individual freedom of choice against the need to ensure the orderly
proceedings essential to a fair trial." 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For an understanding of the court's decision in Bennett, it is important to realize
that Bennett had two separate trials.
"2 The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
11 539 F.2d at 49. The court noted that throughout the first trial Bennett was assert-
ing only his right to represent himself with the assistance of counsel. Id.
1977
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examine certain witnesses but that he could not argue the evi-
dence to the jury. In so limiting Bennett's personal participation,
the trial court determined that matters of argument should be
conducted by the defendant's court-appointed attorney. 34 Ben-
nett appealed his conviction on the ground that he had a statu-
tory and constitutional right to such hybrid representation. The
Tenth Circuit rejected Bennett's claim of a right to appear as co-
counsel, 131 primarily relying on its decision in United States v.
Hill. I The court determined there was no abuse of discretion in
denying such participation to Bennett and in limiting his per-
sonal activity to that of cross-examination of several witnesses.
37
Prior to his second trial, Bennett again requested that he be
allowed to make an opening and closing statement and be permit-
ted to cross-examine certain witnesses. As in his first trial, the
trial court informed him that he would be allowed to cross-
examine witnesses but not to make arguments. Bennett moved to
defend pro se.3 8 After denying a second motion by the defendant
to conduct his own defense, 9 the court appointed counsel on his
" Id. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1958).
" See note 121 supra.
31 See notes 124 through 128 supra and accompanying text.
539 F.2d at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
'9 At a second pretrial hearing the following dialogue occurred:
THE DEFENDANT: . . . I know I am not a qualified attorney to conduct
a full trial, but there are certain aspects of the trial that I feel that I am
competent to proceed with . . . . And because of this [denial of hybrid
representation motion] I was placed in the position of conducting my com-
plete trial, which I will do if the Court still denies me limited assistance of
counsel.
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you are just playing fox with the Court. I can't
understand what you want . ...
THE COURT: What do you want [Shaw, Bennett's attorney] to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Everything else that takes place in this trial.
THE COURT: You mean you want him to conduct your trial except the
part you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: That is right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Shaw, the Court is going to direct that you conduct
this trial . . ..
THE DEFENDANT: I renews [sic] my Motion to be allowed to conduct
my own defense.
Id., Appendix at 56-57.
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behalf. 40 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was faced with yet another
interpretation of Faretta: How soon in the criminal process must
a defendant decide to proceed by counsel or pro se?'4
In holding that the right to self-representation "is one which
the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert before
trial,"'' the court noted that such assertion on the defendant's
part is necessary because the trial court must ascertain whether
the accused has made an understanding waiver of his right to
counsel.'43 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion-Bennett "forfeited his right to self-representation by his
vacillating positions which continued until just six days before
the case was set for trial.""' Thus, there was no error in the trial
court's denial of self-representation."
United States v. Smith' and United States v. Montgo-
mery' raised several interesting issues relating to the effect
of Faretta upon pretrial plea bargaining. In Smith, the defend-
ant was arrested on June 8, 1974,148 and charged with a violation
of the Dyer Act.'49 On both June 10 and 11, while still in custody,
he requested an opportunity to speak with authorities, signing
waivers on both days.5 0 During the course of the interview 5'
'~' 539 F.2d at 50.
' Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Faretto, indicated some of the procedural
questions left open by the majority's decision:
If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still
have a constitutional right to the assistance of standby counsel? How soon
in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial?
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Stiner v.
State, 539 P.2d at 753, where the Oklahoma Court of Appeals directed attention to the
majority's opinion in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, allowing standby counsel for the
accused in certain circumstances.
142 539 F.2d at 50.
"' Id. For a pre-Faretta treatment of this type of issue, see United States v. Shea,
508 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 539 F.2d at 51.
145 Id.
' 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975).
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
525 F.2d at 1017.
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1018.
S The court's opinion is unclear as to whether the defendant made his inculpatory
statements at both interviews or only at the June 11, 1974, interview. The court spoke only
of "the conversation" as being in the nature of plea bargaining. Id. at 1019 n.1.
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Smith made an inculpatory statement as to the Dyer Act viola-
tion. His principal reason for requesting the interview was to offer
to plead guilty to all charges if he could be assured of being sent
to a federal penal institution.'52 The Government introduced
these statements made by Smith during his personal attempt at
bargaining as part of its case-in-chief.'5 3 He was subsequently
convicted and sentenced;'54 this appeal followed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the follow-
ing issues: Whether it was error to admit, as part of the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, inculpatory statements made by the defen-
dant during plea bargaining; and, considering the precedents in-
dicating that plea discussions and agreements pursued by an at-
torney are privileged and inadmissible, of what importance is the
fact that Smith was not represented by counsel when he engaged
in these negotiations? Citing various authority'55 for the general
proposition that plea discussions conducted by a lawyer have
been recognized as privileged and inadmissible, the court ad-
dressed the policy reasons behind the protection of plea bargain-
ing.' 6 The court then concluded that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Faretta'57 and the given inadmissibility of
attorney-conducted plea bargaining discussions, 58 there should
be no distinction when a defendant, who is not represented by
, I Id. at 1018. In its analysis, the court concluded that Smith's purpose in requesting
the two interviews was "to work out an arrangement, whereby he would serve federal time
and thus avoid the state robbery charge." Id. at 1020.
The court indicated that the officer dealing with Smith knew that the purpose of both
interviews was to allow him to bargain. This knowledge was underscored by the fact that
the officer brought an FBI agent to the June l1th interview in connection with the bank
robbery charge. Id.
' Id. at 1019. It was the Government's position in the case that the statements were
confessions made after Smith was advised of his rights under Miranda and that he had
chosen to waive them. Id. at 1019-20. The Tenth Circuit, however, was not persuaded that
"[the signing of a Miranda waiver] effectively negates the legal consequence of the plea
bargaining," since he was seeking an agreement and not making a confession. Id. at 1020.
525 F.2d at 1017.
"' United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Burke v.
Mancusi, 425 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 453 P.2d 22 (1969)
(dictum). See also AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY §
3.4 (Approved Draft 1968); FED. R. EvID. 410; FED. R. Civ. P. 11(e)(6). 525 F.2d at 1020-
21.
156 525 F.2d at 1020. To allow plea bargaining discussions to be admissible in evidence
"would effectively thwart the effort." Id. at 1021.
,., Id. See notes 114-28 supra and accompanying text.
525 F.2d at 1020.
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counsel, is seeking to plea bargain on his own behalf.'59 Thus, in
reversing and remanding, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to receive into evidence inculpatory statements made during plea
bargaining."'
United States v. Montgomery'' presented a somewhat differ-
ent issue than Smith in the area of plea bargaining. Defendant
Montgomery, who had been charged with federal offenses under
a two count indictment," 2 was represented at his omnibus hear-
ing and arraignment by an assistant federal public .defender.
6 3
Before entering his plea at the arraignment, Montgomery "stated
in no uncertain terms that he wished to be represented by some-
one other than a public defender."'' 4 This request was denied and
he "requested that he be allowed to represent himself."'' 5
This request was likewise denied. One month after his arraign-
ment, another federal public defender filed a motion for a con-
tinuance, indicating in the motion that plea bargaining had been
undertaken on Montgomery's behalf.'66 The defendant eventually
entered a guilty plea to a lesser included offense6 7 and was subse-
quently represented by a public defender at the sentencing.6 8 On
appeal, Montgomery alleged error in the trial court's refusal to
allow him to represent himself, citing Faretta. "9
"I Id. at 1021. "Such efforts [plea bargaining on his own behalf] are to be considered
on the same bases as they would be considered if [the defendant] had a lawyer." Id. The
court noted that Smith was considered as a case of first impression. Id. The writer has
been unable to find any cases subsequent to Smith which utilize the same attorney
privilege and Faretta analysis in an instance where defendant bargains on his own behalf.
525 F.2d at 1021-22.
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
162 Montgomery was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1792 (1970).
1" 529 F.2d at 1405.
164 Id.
Id.
ea Montgomery was arraigned on December 9, 1974, and the motion for continuance
was filed on January 9, 1975. Id.
"' The defendant entered a plea of guilty at a hearing conducted in accordance with
FED. R. CraM. P. 11. At a Rule 11 hearing the trial court must determine that the defen-
dant understands the charges against him or her, that there has been no undue influence
upon the defendant to plead, and that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. 529 F.2d
at 1405-06.
" 529 F.2d at 1406.
As to Montgomery's Faretta argument, the court stated:
Mr. Justice Stewart made clear [in Faretta] that in federal courts the right
of self-representation has always been recognized and that indeed specific
provision was made for it in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is currently
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Concluding that his plea was voluntary, the Tenth Circuit
held that appellant Montgomery was "precluded from asserting
that his right to represent himself was infringed."'' 0 The court
deferred to those decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which have consistently held that a voluntary plea of guilty
blocks out any previous constitutional defects in the case 7, and
precludes any efforts to set aside such a plea on constitutional
grounds. "' In affirming Montgomery's conviction, the court
stated that "the voluntary plea of guilty by Montgomery is the
independent intervening act which renders ineffectual the prior
failure to allow appellant to represent himself at a trial.' ' 3
Where there was a twenty-seven-month delay between the
time of indictment and trial, the Tenth Circuit applied a Barker
v. Wingo'71 analysis to determine if the appellant in United States
v. Hay'75 had been prejudiced by such a lengthy delay. 76 Hay, an
codified in 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. Since, then, the federal law has always
recognized the right, it follows that a violation of this guarantee could be
claimed by the defendant regardless of whether Faretta carries retroactive
force.
Id. See Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
7 529 F.2d at 1407. The Tenth Circuit determined that Montgomery's guilty plea
was voluntary and that he waived his right of self-representation when he permitted a
public defender to plea bargain for him. The court noted that Montgomery accepted the
benefits of the bargain by pleading to a lesser included offense. Id.
"I The court cites Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). But see Justice Marshall's dissent in Tollett:
[Elven where counsel does not consider and present to his client the possi-
bility of a challenge to the composition of the grand jury, the client is none-
theless held to have made an "intelligent" guilty plea.
If plea bargaining is to be constitutionally acceptable, it must rest upon
personal choices made by defendants informed about possible alternatives;
at least, they should know what options are open to them [for an intelligent
and knowing act within Brady].
Id. at 270, 273.
,"I The court cites Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The other two cases
in the trilogy are McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
,7 529 F.2d at 1407.
407 U.S. 514 (1972). In deciding whether a defendant has been denied a speedy
trial, the Supreme Court has suggested four factors to be considered: "Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Id. at 530.
,75 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
'' The court's opinion indicated that the Government first learned of criminal activ-
ity involving Hay in January 1969. Following a lengthy investigation, the appellant was
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engineer employed by a prime contractor in the construction of a
public works system in Saigon, South Vietnam, was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.t 77
Balancing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to
the appellant, the court first concluded that the relevant period
for determining whether there had been a denial of a speedy trial
was the period of time from the appellant's arrest to the time of
his trial, i.e., seventeen months."' The court then examined at
great length the reasons advanced by the government "for two
identifiable periods of delay": 179 (1) A deposition procedure in a
foreign country 80 and (2) the unavailability of a witness. 8, Prefac-
indicted by a grand jury on August 18, 1972. At the time of his indictment, however, Hay
was in Mali, Africa. Mali finally revoked his visa, and he was arrested on May 18, 1973,
when his plane landed in New York. He was subsequently convicted at his trial on October
13, 1974. Id. at 993-94.
The court noted the appellant's prejudice claim, "in addition to the anxiety and
concern usually attendant to pending criminal charges, is that he was unable to pursue
his occupation as an engineer because that required him to work overseas. The terms of
his bond restricted him to Colorado and his passport had been lifted." Id. at 996. See
United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1974).
'7 The court's decision indicated that Hay, as the supervisor of a sub-contractor's
work (a French corporation, Les Establissements Eiffel), conspired with employees of
Eiffel to exert efforts to obtain the highest possible allowance on Eiffel's cost overrun claim
to the government of South Vietnam. The United States, through the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, loaned South Vietnam monies for the construction project. 527 F.2d
at 992-93.
"I' The court did not consider the time between appellant's indictment and trial
because he was not available for prosecution. Id. at 993-94. See note 66 supra.
'7, 527 F.2d at 994.
' The court noted that it was necessary to depose bank officials in Switzerland in
order to authenticate appellant's bank account in which he held the monies paid for his
services in the conspiracy. The trial court found that the circumstances of the case justi-
fied the delay, and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Swiss deposition procedure was
"extraordinary and presented both legal and diplomatic problems." Id.
'" The trial court, however, found that the witness' testimony at trial was not essen-
tial. Id. at 995. The Tenth Circuit disposed of this problem by opining that "[wie do not
believe . . . that a witness must be absolutely indispensable to justify reasonable delay."
Id. But see Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 which, the court noted, might
be more stringent due to § 3161(h)(3)(A) which allows for a delay caused by the unavaila-
bility of an "essential" witness. 527 F.2d at 995 n.8. Although the writer has been unable
to find any recent case law interpreting this particular section of the Speedy Trial Act
Judge MacKinnon of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has written: "TheN
[of which (h)(3)(A) is one] are perfectly reasonable interpretations of excusable delay in
court proceedings and generally follow sound law in the United States." United States v.
Brown, 520 F.2d 1106, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon, J., Statement of Reasons in
Support of Sua Sponte Motion to consider the Case En Banc).
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ing its analysis on language from Barker v. Wingo, i.e., that "the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is consid-
erably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge,"' 82 the
court concluded that, given the reasons for the delay in a complex
case such as this,8 3 seventeen months was not long enough to be
so prejudicial as to justify reversal.8 4 The Tenth Circuit thus
determined that the appellant was not denied a speedy trial. 181
IV. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Pretrial Motions to Suppress
In United States v. Kay8 ' and United States v. Cassidy,'87
the Tenth Circuit reversed trial court decisions granting motions
to suppress evidence. In Kay there was a noted absence of any
witnesses sworn or any evidence received at the "hearing" despite
the fact that the defendant's fourth amendment issue was
"largely factual and sharply contested."' 8 Recognizing that "the
statements and argument of counsel are not a substitute for a
proper evidentiary hearing," the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the action was
improper at that time. 8 '
In Cassidy the trial court found that the defendant had not
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights' 8 since he had been under
considerable "pressure" at the time.'' Finding this to be "pure
speculation" unsupported by the evidence,' 2 the Tenth Circuit
407 U.S. at 531.
1 See notes 180 and 181 supra and accompanying text.
"" The court concluded that the 17-month delay did not prejudice Hay in the prepa-
ration of his defense. 527 F.2d at 996.
". Id. at 997.
,, No. 76-1299 (10th Cir., June 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' No. 76-1137 (10th Cir., Mar. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 76-1299 at 2.
,, Id. See United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
'" No. 76-1137 at 3. There was evidence introduced at trial that the defendant was
fully apprised of his Miranda rights and that he understood these rights. However, he
chose to give a statement to the agent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"' The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial judge had taken into consideration, among
other things, evidence introduced in a companion case in reaching his determination that
the statement was involuntary. No. 76-1137 at 3.
192 In holding that the trial court's findings in this matter were totally without merit,
the Tenth Circuit stated: "The observation by the trial court that Cassidy had been under
'pressure' during the time he was holding hostages and brandishing firearms in his escape
efforts and therefore could not thereafter 'voluntarily' give a statement is pure speculation
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reversed: "[Cilaims of instability, employment difficulties, psy-
chiatric treatment, fear of policemen and being tired and hungry
will not serve to overcome confessions given after proper Miranda
warnings with no evidence of force, threats or promises being used
to obtain the confessions."'' 3
B. Prejudicial Joinder of Offenses
In United States v. Kinard"4 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
appellant's argument that he had suffered substantial prejudice
due to the joinder into a single trial of six separate substantive
charges and a conspiracy charge.'95 Referring to the principles laid
down in United States v. Burkhart, " the court found determina-
tive the fact that proof of the various offenses would have been
admissible even if separate trials had been ordered.'97
In United States v. Day98 the defendant appealed denial of
and insufficient to support the trial court's findings." Id. at 4. See United States v.
Adams, 470 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1972), where the Tenth Circuit held that the determination
of "whether a waiver is understandingly and voluntarily made may be established by the
circumstances of the case." Id. at 251.
"I No. 76-1137 at 4 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 456 F.2d 178, 179 (10th Cir.
1972)).
' No. 75-1066 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 and 13, the Tenth Circuit concluded that such joinder
was procedurally proper. No. 75-1066 at 11.
458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972). Articulating the general rule applicable to receiving
the evidence of other crimes, the Tenth Circuit, in Burkhart, held:
Such evidence in the first instance is inadmissible. There are, however,
several exceptions which allow such evidence to be received in special cir-
cumstances and for limited purposes. It may be received for the purpose of
proving a common plan, scheme or design to commit the offense charged or
for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity
or absence of mistake, inadvertence or accident.
Id. at 204. See DeVore v. United States, 368 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1966); Mills v. United
States, 367 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1966); Woodland v. United States, 347 F.2d 956 (10th Cir.
1965); Weeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963); Berry v. United States, 271
F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1972);
Moran v. United States, 404 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1968); Morgan v. United States, 355 F.2d
43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1025 (1966).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant not only neglected to request a sever-
ance of the charges, but a claim of prejudicial joinder was not asserted at the trial court
level until the defendant made his motion for a new trial. Although it was recognized that
a "[flailure to request severance by a pretrial motion generally constitutes a waiver," the
Tenth Circuit refrained from deciding whether his objections should be heard as raised in
his motion for a new trial. Instead, it chose to proceed on the grounds that it was a
nonmeritorious claim of prejudice. No. 75-1066 at 12.
" ' 533 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1976).
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his motion to require the Government to elect between a homicide
charge and a charge of accessory after the fact."99 The appellant
argued that since he could not be convicted on both charges, there
was a legal bar to trying him on both counts. In determining that
this argument was fallacious, the Tenth Circuit noted that it
could have based its holding on the grounds that it was a proper
joinder in the absence of prejudice.00 However, in view of the
appellant's failure to make any pretrial motions with regard to
prejudice and his subsequent acquittal on the homicide charge,
the court determined that the proper grounds for affirmance of
the accessory after the fact conviction was that "acquittal on one
misjoined count cures a misjoinder. ' '2 1'
"I The Tenth Circuit acknowledged FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 as the proper remedy when
a defendant is prejudiced by a joinder. The rule provides the trial court with machinery
to require an election if, in its own sound discretion, it finds prejudice.
2"n The Tenth Circuit referred to the FED. R. CalM. P. 8(a) which allows joinder if the
offenses "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan." See United States v. Van Scoy, 482 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1973),
where the Tenth Circuit held: "Although Van Scoy could not be convicted of both bank
robbery and being an accessory after the fact, it is clear the offenses are based upon
transactions constituting parts of a common scheme and thus fall within Rule 8(a) juris-
diction." Id. at 349.
11 533 F.2d at 526. The Tenth Circuit chose to base its holding upon the general
principle stated in Gornick v. United States, 320 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1963), where the
court refused to find prejudice in the denial of a motion to grant a separate trial on each
count when the appellant was found not guilty on one of the counts. See United States v.
Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1941); Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1931);
Latses v. United States, 45 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1930); Weinhandler v. United States, 20
F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1927); Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1926); Beaux-Arts
Dresses v. United States, 9 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1925). But see Cross v. United States, 335
F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the general rule is not applicable where there
is a multiplicity of charges so as to "make it difficult for the jury to sort out the evidence
pertaining separately to each charge, and the subsequent related problems with the in-
structions." 533 F.2d at 526-27. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
In his appeal, the appellant in Day also made a "belated expression" of his desire to
testify as to only one of the counts. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as being
too late. However, it has been recognized that under some circumstances "[pirejudice
may develop when an accused wishes to testify on one but not the other of two joined
offenses." Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964). For the appli-
cable standard in such cases see Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968),"
where the court held:
[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing
showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count
and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. In making such a
showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough informa-
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C. Jury Selection
Although the problems encountered in empaneling the jury
were "perhaps regrettable," the Tenth Circuit upheld the convic-
tion in United States v. Johnson.'20 At the time jury selection was
to commence, there was a noticeable absence of blacks in the
group of prospective jurors.103 After the jury array had been ex-
hausted, the United States Marshal was directed to get prospec-
tive jurors off the streets within the vicinity of the courthouse.
This was the manner in which the jury was finally selected. The
Tenth Circuit cited defense counsel's failure to make a motion to
challenge the array under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) as determinative. 104
A similar challenge to strike the petit jury was made in
United States v. Bennett 05 where there was only one black avail-
able on the jury panel. The appellant argued that an improper
selection of prospective jurors had been made in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1861,200 because lists of actual voters were used in lieu
of voter registration lists. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the
grounds articulated by the court in Leggroan v. Smith"7 where it
tion-regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count
and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other-to satisfy the court
that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh
the considerations of "economy and expedition in judicial administration"
against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testi-
fying.
Id. at 977.
2 No. 74-1666 (10th Cir., Oct. 31, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I Counsel for the defendant made a motion for a continuance (which was subse-
quently denied) but failed to make any motion challenging the array pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1867 (1970). See note 19 infra.
"I' The court noted that compliance with this section "is the exclusive means by
which a person accused of a federal crime may challenge a jury array on the grounds that
it was not selected in conformity with the provisions of the Jury Selection & Service Act
of 1968." No. 74-1666 at 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e).
539 F.2d 45 (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) requires "that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."
21 498 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974). In Leggroan the entire jury panel was challenged on
the grounds that it was selected from tax assessment rolls thereby effectively "excluding
nonproperty owners and prejudicially reducing the number of women, young people, poor
people and members of minority races." Id. at 169. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "no
rational basis exists for such a discriminatory exclusion and that the jury selection method
used was constitutionally improper." Id. at 171. See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320 (1970) (reiterates the states' freedom in confining selection of prospective jurors to
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was recognized that a mode of jury selection must be upheld when
the proof offered failed to show "that a recognizable, identifiable
class of persons, otherwise entitled to be jury members, has been




In United States v. Trujillo °9 a sixth amendment challenge
was raised against the jury composition where the defendant ob-
jected to six of the jurymen who had previously served in narcot-
ics cases. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that "service on
prior juries in cases having similar issues does not of itself exclude
a juror from serving." 10
those citizens meeting qualifications such as age, education, good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character); United States v. King, 492 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1974) (the
court summarily held that the Jury Service and Selection Act of 1968 was not violated by
the use of voter registration lists); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C.
1974) (court rejected complaint that a juror wheel, which was composed from the voter
registration list exclusively, consequently resulted in an improper representation of the
community as to race, economic status, or age); Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure,
52 DEN. L.J. 133, 148-49 (1975).
"1' 498 F.2d at 170. The Tenth Circuit, in Bennett, also noted that the statistics
offered by the defendant did not show that the proportion of blacks to whites actually
voting was any less than the proportion registered to vote in the counties from which the
array was drawn. The defendant had based his proof on national figures. 539 F.2d at 55.
2" No. 74-1834 (10th Cir., Sept. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication). See also
United States v. Jasper, 523 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1975) (court rejected the claim that jurors
who had been challenged in a kindred case immediately preceding this one were ineligible
to serve on this jury).
10 No. 74-1834 at 9 (citing Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963)). See Virgin Islands v. Williams, 476 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1973),
where the Third Circuit stated:
[Federal courts have uniformly held that, absent some evidence of actual
partiality, a juror is not disqualified merely because he previously sat in a
similar case arising out of a separate and distinct set of circumstances even
though the offenses charged in the cases are similar and some of the same
prosecution witnesses testify in each case.
Id. at 773.
For courts upholding a jury panel despite the fact that some of the jurors had pre-
viously served in a similar case and/or heard testimony of the same prosecution witnesses,
see United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974);
United States v. Salazar, 480 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1120 (1968); United States v. Cooper, 332 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1964); Casias v. United States,
315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963); Calderon v. United States, 269
F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1959); Harbold v. United States, 255 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1958); Cwach
v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1954); Belvin v. United States, 12 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1926); Haussener v. United States, 4 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1925); Wilkes v. United States,
291 F. 988 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 719 (1923). But see United States v. Stevens,
444 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971), where the Sixth Circuit held that "whenever avoidable,
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The absence of procedural safeguards necessitated by
pretrial and trial publicity provided the basis for appeals in
United States v. Hall"' and United States v. Coppola.2" The
Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention in Hall that the
trial judge's voir dire of prospective jurors was inadequate in light
of the alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity. In determining that
there was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that, although the trial judge's questions were
not as numerous or detailed as those submitted by the appellant,
they contained the import of his inquiry."'
The Tenth Circuit likewise rejected the argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel to ask the questions.
In averring to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, the court held that either the court or counsel is permitted
to conduct the voir dire."'
jurors should not be called to serve in cases involving witnesses or parties who participated
in cases in which they were previously impanelled."
2 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1976).
212 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975).
213 The appellant also alleged error by the trial judge due to his refusal to ask all of
the questions offered by the appellant. 536 F.2d at 324. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409
U.S. 524, 527 (1973), where the Court held that a trial judge "was not required to put the
question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the
subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner." See also Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the
defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper.
For the scope of review of a trial court's discretion under this rule see Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966), where the Tenth Circuit held that "[tihe court's
discretion under this rule will not be disturbed, unless it appears from the record that its
voir dire was inadequate to properly test the qualifications and competency of the prospec-
tive jurors to sit on trial of the case." Id. at 618. See also United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d
1019 (10th Cir. 1975); Goosman v. A Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Alvarez
v. United States, 282 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d
433 (4th Cir. 1951); Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1947).
The appellant also alleged error in the trial judge's failure to question each juror
individually. While the Tenth Circuit recognized that it may have been better practice
to conduct an individual voir dire of each prospective juror due to the publicity prior to
the trial, the failure to do so was not error. The court distinguished Silverthorne v. United
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In Coppola the appeal was based on the failure to admonish
jurors at the end of each day's session to refrain from reading
newspapers, watching television, or listening to radio accounts of
the trial. Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that it is better
practice to repeat this warning throughout the trial,"' the court
determined that there was no prejudice where the trial judge
relied on his preliminary admonition which had been given gener-
ally to all of the prospective veniremen prior to empaneling of the
jury.
216
D. Admissibility of Evidence
The question of hearsay as to the testimony of a prosecution
witness was confronted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Coppola.217 The appellant was convicted of first degree murder
and conspiracy to commit the murder of a fellow inmate, one
Willard Hardaway.2 1 The facts support the conclusion that Har-
States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), where the defendant's conviction was reversed and
remanded when, in view of the voluminous and highly inflammatory publicity prior to the
trial, the court failed to conduct individual questioning of the prospective jurors. The
Ninth Circuit expressed its preference for the following rule: "Whenever there is believed
to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because
of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect
to his exposure shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective
jurors." 400 F.2d at 639 n.1 5 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS §
3.4(a) (Tent. Draft 1966) (selecting the jury-method of examination)). The Tenth Circuit
distinguished Silverthorne due to the essentially factual newsreporting in Hall rather than
opinions as to guilt. It was felt that this newsreporting was neither inflammatory nor
prejudicial. 536 F.2d at 326. See United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1971)
(following the Ninth Circuit's rule). See also Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961).
2' 526 F.2d at 775-76. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961), where the court reversed the conviction because the trial
court permitted the jury to separate overnight and for a long weekend without cautioning
them prior to each separation against reading anything about the case:
And in all criminal cases whenever jurors are permitted to separate, the court
should invariably admonish them not to communicate with any person or
allow any person to communicate with them on any subject connected with
the trial, and not to read published accounts of the course of the trial.
272 F.2d at 507 (citing Brown v. United States, 99 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1938)).
2I" The Tenth Circuit based its affirmance on the harmless error rule as articulated
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
217 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir, 1975).
21 Id. at 766.
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daway was killed when he failed to deliver a requisite amount of
heroin to the appellant, who had arranged for it to be delivered
inside the walls of Leavenworth."'
The prosecution witness, Killian Joe Herman, worked as an
orderly in the segregation area of Leavenworth. Herman testified
that he was to deliver heroin to one Molina as compensation for
killing Hardaway at defendant-appellant's behest. In this testi-
mony he related to the court certain responsive comments made
by the defendant-appellant to Herman in reaction to inculpating
statements that had been made by Molina to Herman regarding
Molina's payoff. 20 The import of these statements by the appel-
lant directed Herman to assure Molina that due payment would
be forthcoming and that he would keep Molina in heroin "'as
long as they was [sic] together and had the stuff available
. . ' '221 Herman's testimony regarding the statements of Mo-
lina to which the defendant-appellant had responded was admit-
ted into evidence despite considerable objection by the defense
that such testimony was hearsay.
22
The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the appellant's challenge to
admittance of this testimony, chose to view the hearsay state-
ments as adoptions by the appellant wherein "it appear[ed] the
accused understood and unambiguously assented to those state-
ments. 223 In conclusion, the court held that Herman's recounting
of Molina's statements and the defendant-appellant's comments
in response to them were properly admitted under the party ad-
missions exception to the hearsay rule.
"I Id. There had been evidence introduced at trial which indicated that the appellant
was the major supplier of heroin at the penitentiary. Id. at 776.
211 Id. at 768.
121 Id. at 769.
2 Id.
Id. n.2. See Naples v. United States, 344 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1069, 1071-72 (Chadbourne rev., 1972). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pear-
son, 194 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1952) (information given by the driver of the car regarding his
employment by the insured was sufficiently acquiesced in by the insured when he failed
to deny the statement made in his presence, rendering it an admission that the driver was
insured's employee at the time of the accident).
For cases holding that a statement made in the presence of an accused, which state-
ment necessarily calls for his denial if untrue, may be relevant as an adoptive admission,
due to his failure to deny the statement, see Ishler v. Cook, 299 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Arpan, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Alker, 255 F.2d
851 (3d Cir. 1958); Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
1977
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In United States v. Jones224 and United States v. Swain2 1 the
Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of tape recordings over the
appellants' objections. In Jones the appellant was convicted on
the basis of tape recordings made contemporaneously with his
sale of cocaine and heroin to a government informant."' The
tapes were challenged on the grounds that they were "inaudible,
susceptible to misinterpretation and highly prejudicial."", The
appellant also argued that it was error to permit the informant
to corroborate his own testimony through use of these tapes.
2
1
Noting that the admissibility of a tape recording is "within
the sound discretion of the trial judge,"2 2 the Tenth Circuit held
that the discretion exercised here was without error where there
was also substantial corroboration for the informant's testimony
from the Drug Enforcement Administration agent who had made
the tapes in question. 230 The court, in assuming that the two tapes
were played in their entirety at trial, concluded that the record,
taken as a whole, showed no prejudicial error in connection with
the tapes.231 However, despite the court's acquiesence in the trial
"' 540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976).
" No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
22 540 F.2d at 467.
22 Id. It should be noted that the Government admitted, prior to trial, that parts of
the two tapes were incomprehensible, other parts were incomplete, and still others were
totally inaccurate. Due to these problems, the Government assured that no use would be
made of the transcripts at trial. Id. at 469.
22 Id. The trial court permitted the informer to testify in the presence of the jury on
the contents of the inaudible tapes, despite objections from the defense that this was
extremely prejudicial and inflammatory. Id. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the flagrant
insufficiency of the recordings, noting that the court reporter was unable to decipher and
record what portion of the tape was being played or whose voices were being heard. Id.
I" Id. at 470. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (loth Cir. 1973);
United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United
States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); United
States v. Madda, 345 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1965); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
2" 540 F.2d at 470. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[uinless the unintelligible por-
tions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, it may be
admitted; this is especially so where a witness who heard the statements also testifies and
the recording gives independent support to his testimony." Id. See Monroe v. United
States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
"1 540 F.2d at 469.
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court's action, the Tenth Circuit did provide the prosecution with
a caveat:
To avoid danger of reversal for an inadequate record and possi-
ble prejudice, some means should be used to identify clearly those
portions of the tapes played at trial. These tapes, or transcribed
portions of them, should be included in the record on appeal. In the
trial court's discretion the use of tapes may be conditioned on ad-
vance preparation of an accurate transcript . .. .
A similar issue arose in United States v. Swain33 where the
appellant based his challenge on the admission of a tape which
had been recorded contemporaneously with the attempted rape
for which he was now on trial. The appellant argued that portions
of the tape were inaudible and the admittance thereof constituted
prejudicial error. 234 Reiterating the importance of the trial judge's
discretion in these matters, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ad-
missibility of the tape:
It is well settled that a recording is admissible unless there are
inaudible portions which are so substantial that the recording as a
whole is not trustworthy . . . . Whether or not the inaudible por-
tions are so substantial that the recording is not trustworthy has
repeatedly been held to be a determination for the trial judge acting
within his discretion. m
The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court had conducted an
in camera hearing wherein the tape had been reviewed in its
entirety and the court had subsequently determined that the in-
audible portions were not so substantial or untrustworthy so as
to require the tape's exclusion.23
E. Scope of Direct and Cross-Examination
The scope of cross-examination by defense counsel was ad-
dressed by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Brooks, 237 United
States v. Logan,25 and United States v. Estell.2 39 In these cases
In Id. n.3.
m No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
23 Id. at 5.
''Id.
'' Id. at 6. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 437 (2d Cir. 1972); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641,
651-52 (1st Cir. 1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1961); Monroe
v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2" No. 75-1638 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
2' No. 75-1693 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976).
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the defendants-appellants argued that it was error for a trial
judge to restrict defense counsel's inquiry into the misdeeds of
government witnesses.2 1 In affirming the appellants' convictions,
the Tenth Circuit emphasized that "[tihe scope of cross-
examination is broad, but it is not unlimited. '24 ' Recognizing that
this determination is within the "sound discretion" of the trial
court,'2 12 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court ruling would
not be disturbed where "Itihe matters sought to be inquired into
do not appear to be relevant or in anywise germane to the central
issue in the case .... ,,243
240 The same government witness testified in all three cases. The unrelated criminal
activity of the witness included the theft of government meat, forging checks, concealing
weapons, and a possible homicide. In his cross-examination of the government witness,
defense counsel sought to inquire into the witness' background in an attempt to bring out
these past criminal acts as evidence of his "evil character." No. 75-1693 at 6-7.
241 No. 75-1638 at 8. The Tenth Circuit agreed that such inquiry into the prosecution
witness' alleged misdeeds were irrelevant in that they had no connection with the charges
then pending against any of the defendants, namely, knowing possession of heroin with
the intent to distribute the same. Id. at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in con-
cluding that such inquiry was "not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." 539 F.2d
at 700.
242 No. 75-1693 at 6; No. 75-1638 at 8-9; 539 F.2d at 700. See United States v. Spivey,
508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Whitlock v. United States, 429
F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970); McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1964);
Darby v. United States, 283 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1960); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d
222 (10th Cir. 1960).
2I No. 75-1638 at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. See also United States
v. Jones, No. 75-1338 (10th Cir., Mar. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), where the
Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court for refusing to admit testimony bearing upon the
character for veracity of a prosecution witness. The Tenth Circuit adopted the language
used in Atkinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 197 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1952), where it was
held that "[tihe credibility of the witness is always relevant in the search for truth
." Id. at 246. In Atkinson it was recognized that the trial court's duty is only to
protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the bounds of rele-
vancy merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. . . . Evidence challenging
directly the truth of what the witness has said about matters material to the
issue on trial, cannot be called collateral and immaterial to the issue of the
credibility of the witness, and it is admissible for that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also FED. R. EvID. 608(a); 3A WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 981, 983 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
It is curious why the Tenth Circuit did not affirm the trial courts' action in these three
cases on the grounds articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pennix, 313
F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963), where the court stated that "witnesses ... may, for purposes of
impeachment, be questioned as to prior convictions . . . . But it is clearly established
that the cross-examiner may not go further and inquire of a defendant concerning only
his prior arrest or indictment for a crime." Id. at 529 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit, in Brooks, noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that
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In United States v. Larry "' direct examination of the defen-
dant's expert witness was wrongfully restricted by the trial court
where the defendant sought to rebut the trustworthiness of testi-
mony given by an expert government witness. The government
witness had testified to his conclusions concerning a chemical
analysis that had been conducted to detect the existence of her-
oin. The Tenth Circuit, commenting upon the trial court's mis-
conception of the answers called for by the questions, recognized
that the questions did not call for the opinion of one expert as to
the qualifications of another expert, but would only indicate disa-
greement as to the conclusions drawn by the other expert.245 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit concluded that this error did not require
reversal 242
F. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In United States v. Stricklin 2 7 the appellants' appealed their
respective convictions of possession of 2,250 pounds of marijuana
with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).2 41 The defendants were apprehended while riding in a
pickup behind a vehicle and trailer which contained 2,250 pounds
of marijuana. Two bricks of marijuana were found in the pickup
and these were "similar or identical in appearance" to those in
the vehicle and trailer.24 The defendants contended that this
the government witness had ever been charged with murder, that there was evidence that
he had been arrested on a concealed weapons charge, but no evidence on a conviction,
and that he had allegedly stolen government meat and forged checks. No. 75-1638 at 8.
The Fourth Circuit, in Pennix, recognized that the probative value of this type of evidence
is "overwhelmingly outweighed by its inevitable tendency to inflame and prejudice the
jury .... " 313 F.2d at 529. See United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1970).
24 522 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1975).
245 Id. at 266. The court distinguished United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), wherein the Tenth Circuit held that
it was improper to direct questions to one expert as to the qualifications of another expert.
'" 522 F.2d at 266.
247 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1976).
24K 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) states, in part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-(1) to ... possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance .... " The defendants were also charged with and
convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
"1g 534 F.2d at 1390. The search of the pickup was proper where nightime hunting
tools were in plain view of the officer, giving him probable cause to believe that appellants
were engaged in illegal hunting. Id.
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evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for posses-
sion of the marijuana in the trailer. 5 ' Concluding that this cir-
cumstantial evidence certainly supported the inference that the
two bricks of marijuana came from the trailer, 5' the Tenth Cir-
cuit characterized the situation as amounting to constructive
possession where "the appellants were all engaged in some joint
activity relative to the marijuana . ".2..52
Similarly, the sufficiency of the evidence connecting the ap-
pellant with the theft of a tractor and two trailers was the basis
for appeal in United States v. Wofford.25 3 The appellant argued
that evidence tending to show that he had "possession" of the
property subsequent to the theft was insufficient to prove that he
actually was in possession or that he committed the offense as
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 659.214 The Tenth Circuit, acknowledg-
1 534 F.2d at 1390. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), where the
Court held that although evidence should be viewed by circuit courts in a light most
favorable to the Government, the conviction must be supported by "substantial evi-
dence."
251 Id.
152 Id. See Amaya v. United States, 373 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1967), where the Tenth
Circuit defined "possession," as the term is used in the federal narcotics laws, to include
both actual and constructive possession:
[Tihat constructive possession meant that although the narcotic may be in
the physical possession of another, the defendant knowingly had the power
of exercising control over it; that possession was not limited to manual touch
or personal custody; that it was sufficient to constitute possession under the
statute if the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotic and
control over it ....
Id. at 199. See also United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Malfi, 264 F.2d 147 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
In addition to the "constructive possession" rationale, the circuit courts have also
used language rejecting a distinction between the weight to be accorded direct evidence
of possession and that of circumstantial evidence of possession in supporting a conviction.
See United States v. Pinna, 229 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1956), where it was contended by the
appellant that direct proof of possession is essential in order to give rise to the presumption
of importation. In denying the validity of this argument, the Seventh Circuit held: "We
know of no reason . . . why possession proven by circumstantial evidence should be
treated any differently from possession proven by direct evidence." Id. at 218. See also
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Sewell
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1969); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114
(9th Cir. 1962); Eason v. United States, 281 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. United
States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951).
2m No. 75-1185 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) defines the offense, in part, as follows: "Whoever ... steals,
or unlawfully takes, carries away . . . with intent to convert to his own use any goods or
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ing that the evidence received had established the defendant's
"dominion over" the stolen property,255 affirmed the conviction on
the following grounds:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had possession
of property recently stolen gives rise to the inference that the ac-
cused knew the property was stolen and also to the inference that
the defendant participated in the theft of the property. There is no
requirement that the possession need be exclusive in the accused
... . [Plossession can exist on a joint basis with another actor.'"
G. Trial Judge Conduct
The conduct of the trial judges was at issue in United States
v. Sporcich257 and United States v. Hill. 8 In Sporcich the appel-
chattels ... which constitute an interstate ... shipment of ... property; ... Shall in
each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
2" There was testimony placing the defendant-appellant as one of three men attempt-
ing to drive the equipment onto the witness' rural property. In addition, the witness
testified that the defendant-appellant remained behind to watch the truck while the
others went to seek assistance in moving the vehicles. No. 75-1185 at 3.
256 Id. at 4. The Tenth Circuit cited Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1969) in support of this proposition. It should be noted that the trial court in Sewell was
careful to instruct the jury that they should acquit if possession was at all consistent with
innocence. In Wofford the Tenth Circuit stressed the instruction that possession had to
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the inference of theft to be drawn.
No. 75-1185 at 5. See Rugendorg v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), where Mr. Justice
Clark stated:
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, Chief Justice Fuller held for a
unanimous Court that "[plossession of the fruits of crime, recently after its
commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession,
and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight
unless explained by circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent
with innocence."
Id. at 536-37. See United States v. Lang, No. 75-1263 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for
Routine Publication); United States v. Prujansky, 415 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1968); Avon v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.
1967); Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967);
Gregory v. United States, 364 F.2d 210 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 962 (1966);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1960); Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d
252 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 921 (1960); Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d
681 (6th Cir. 1951).
A strong dissent in Wofford suggests that the Tenth Circuit allowed an impermissible
"inference upon an inference" to be made in this case when it held the proof sufficient to
sustain the conviction. The dissent points out that the witness' testimony placing the
defendant in the truck and later assisting in moving the equipment off of the highway and
onto the witness' property, etc. was too "meager" an association with the stolen property
to make this inference applicable. No. 75-1185 at 8-10 (Hill, J., dissenting).
No. 74-1569 (10th Cir., Dec. 5, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975).
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lant argued that she was denied a fair trial due to the deprecatory
remark by the trial judge as to the ethics of her counsel.259 Recog-
nizing that an allegedly prejudicial comment must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis,2  the Tenth Circuit concluded that this
comment was indeed unfortunate, but it was "not so prejudicial
as to deny [the appellant] a fair trial.
2'
In Hill the appellant's claim of prejudice was based upon the
judge's order to have him removed from the courtroom due to his
endless "harangue" and the judge's subsequent smile during the
removal.262 In light of the neutralizing instruction given to the
151 In the presence of the jury, the court stated to defense counsel: "Mr. Wallace, there
are adequate remedies for that. This is not the time to try them out. Ethical counsel would
know better than to do it in a trial such as this. Now, if that's what you have in mind,
quit it." No. 74-1569 at 8 (emphasis in original).
"' See United States v. Roell, 487 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1973). In Roell the judge made
comments where counsel was a bit "overzealous" in questioning a witness. The Eighth
Circuit stated that "this court is required to view these comments from the perspective
of the proceedings as a whole." Id. at 403.
"I1 No. 74-1569 at 8. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 892 (9th Cir. 1974)
(citing Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962)).
In Smith the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Flew, if any judges can altogether avoid words or action, inadvertent or
otherwise, which seem inappropriate when later examined in the calm clois-
ters of the appellate court. But unless such misadventures so persistently
pervade the trial or, considered individually or together, are of such magni-
tude that a courtroom climate unfair to the defendant is discernible from the
cold record, the defendant is not sufficiently aggrieved to warrant a new trial.
305 F.2d at 205. See also United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1974) (while judge's
comments were improper, they did not approach the level of harshness or contempt for
the defense); United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 972 (1974) (trial court may "reprimand or rebuff" counsel if necessary to maintain
control); United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1973) (where court's comments
did not suggest guilt, comments were directed at counsel only, remainder of court's rulings
were evenhanded between both sides, and strong curative instructions were made in an
attempt to erase prejudice to the defendant, the Second Circuit concluded that a new trial
was not necessary); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973) (conviction was reversed where the cumulative effect of the court's
remarks deprecating defense counsel was to prejudice the jury against the defense case);
Whitlock v. United States, 429 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970) (rebuffing counsel as to several
points and objections did not interfere with a fair trial); United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d
1091 (10th Cir. 1969) (admonishing of counsel in regard to examination of exhibits did not
deny defendant a fair trial); Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1968) (where
it was not reversible error for the court to refer to counsel's arguments as ridiculous).
20 After asking the defendant several times if he was finished with his outrageous
conduct, which included personal attacks on the court, the judge had him removed from
the courtroom by marshals. The judge admitted that he had difficulty in restraining
himself from smiling because of the magnitude of appellant's conduct.
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jury immediately following the defendant's removal,1 3 the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the trial judge's conduct did not prevent
the appellant from receiving a fair trial .2  The court noted that
these actions did not approach the conduct condemned by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Nazarro,211 where the trial
judge had participated in the trial to such an extent that a
"partisan purpose" on his part could be inferred.216
H. Closing Arguments
The prosecutor in United States v. Bishop26 7 remarked, in his
summation to the jury, that "the evidence in this case is uncon-
tradicted [as to the the defendant's passing of counterfeit
bills] ."265 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
this statement could be interpreted as a comment on his failure
to testify. 2"1 In affirming the denial of the defendant's motion, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the test articulated in Knowles v. United
States: 1 "Whether the language used was manifestly intended or
was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessar-
ily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to tes-
tify. ' " In applying the Knowles test, the Tenth Circuit empha-
sized the fact that there were witnesses other than the defendant,
63 The court stated to the jury, in part: "This is not evidence. Ignore what he has
said. He is highly emotional this morning . . . .It is not proper and you will not allow
yourselves to be influenced by his conduct or by what he says." 526 F.2d at 1025.
" The Tenth Circuit, acknowledging that the trial judge should not have smirked,
chose to recognize that the "appellant was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
Id. (citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)). In Lutwak the Court
supported this proposition by citing Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: "(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. at 619-20, 620 n.4.
2- 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973).
266 In Nazarro the judge participated extensively in examining witnesses. It was noted
that he continuously rehabilitated prosecution witnesses and designed questions to inject
doubt as to the credibility of defense witnesses. He also frequently interrupted the testi-
mony of defense witnesses. The Second Circuit concluded that the only remedy for the
prejudice suffered here was to reverse and remand for a new trial. The court stated, "even
if a judge's interjections are not motivated by a partisan purpose, 'he must not. . . permit
even the appearance of such an interference."' Id. at 310 (citing United States v. Curcio,
279 F.2d 681, 682 (2d Cir. 1960)).
267 534 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1976).
I Id. at 219.
21 Id. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
-0 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
"1 534 F.2d at 220 (citing Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d at 170).
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Bishop, who could have been called to testify as to her lack of
knowledge and intent. Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that it was not error for the prosecutor to comment "that
the evidence against the defendant [was] uncontradicted, espe-
cially where the facts in issue could have been controverted by
persons other than the defendant." '72
In United States v. Adcox 2 3 the Tenth Circuit reacted with
strong disapproval to the prosecutor's closing argument wherein
he made an emotional appeal to the jury that the people of the
town in which the crime was committed were watching them (the
jury) to see if they were going to condone it or condemn it.27 ' The
Tenth Circuit interpreted this argument as placing the task of
enforcing the law on the jury which had the effect of implying
that what they did in this case would determine whether there
would be law or lawlessness.25 In spite of its recognition that the
prosecutor's closing argument was invalid, the Tenth Circuit af-




The failure to give a cautionary instruction on accomplice
testimony was held to be reversible error in United States v.
Holland, 277 where the only evidence against the defendant was the
testimony of accomplices. The Tenth Circuit found this to be
M 534 F.2d at 219. See United States v. Williams, 479 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Follette, 418 F.2d at 1266 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Desmond v. United
States, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965), where the First Circuit held that a comment concern-
ing the "lack of contradiction" is improper "unless it is apparent on the record that
there was someone other than himself whom the defendant could have called." Id. at 227
(emphasis added).
v' No. 75-1400 (10th Cir., Apr. 7, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I' Id. at 8.
vs Id.
171 Id. at 9. In support of its holding, the Adcox court cited United States v. Worth,
505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975), and United States v.
Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971), wherein the Tenth Circuit affirmed both convic-
tions, despite its avid disapproval of the prosecutor's closing statements. The court noted
that "there was no infringement of appellant's substantial rights within the meaning of
Rule 52 FED. R. CraM. P." in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. No. 75-1400 at
9. See Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure, 53 DEN. L.J. 109, 120-21 (1976).
27 No. 75-1556 (10th Cir., Apr. 8, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
VOL. 54
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
plain error "affecting substantial rights" and a reversal was re-
quired despite the fact that the defendant failed to request such
an instruction."
Faced with a similar situation, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
jury instructions on accomplice testimony in United States v.
Carpenter.'7 The court emphasized that the trial court had gone
even further than had previously been required by Butler v.
United States,2 80 since the trial court instructed the jury: "You
should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testi-
mony of an accomplice unless you believe the unsupported testi-
mony beyond a reasonable doubt.
'28'
2. Defendant's Theory of Defense
A refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury as to the
defendant's theory of defense was the basis for challenge in
United States v. Swinton5 2 and United States v. Robison.283 In
Swinton the defendant contended that he was merely a
"procuring agent" and was not "engaged in the business of deal-
ing in firearms." The Tenth Circuit held that this request to have
a "procuring agent" instruction submitted to the jury was non-
meritorious in view of the fact that the defendant had chosen not
to testify and had also neglected to present any evidence that he
was acting only as such an agent.24
" Id. at 2. The rule of law regarding an instruction on accomplice testimony was
articulated in Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969), where the Tenth
Circuit held: "[Iln federal courts the testimony of an accomplice need not be corrobor-
ated, but the court must instruct the jury as to the manner in which such testimony should
be considered." Id. at 1105. See United States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Birmingham, 447
F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lujan, 444 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1971).
'7 535 F.2d 1218 (10th Cir. 1976).
408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969). The instruction given by the Tenth Circuit in Butler
was as follows: "The mere fact that a witness is an accomplice does not mean that he is
an incompetent witness or that he can't tell the truth, but it does mean that testimony is
to be weighed with great care and received with caution." Id. at 1105.
" 535 F.2d at 1219 n.2. See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1968).
22 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1494 (10th Cir., Mar. 31, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
521 F.2d at 1260. "While a defendant is entitled to instructions on any theory of
defense finding support in the evidence presented and the law . . . , a trial court is not
required to instruct on a defendant's theory of the case when such an instruction has no
foundation in evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
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A similar conclusion was reached in Robison where, indicted
for refusing and resisting arrest, the defendant based the theory
of defense on his apprehension as to the identity of the officers
who stopped him. Although the defendant testified as to this, the
Tenth Circuit held that there was no evidence to "reasonably
support" such a theory32
J. Post-trial Matters
1. Sentencing
In United States v. Murdaugh26 the trial court rejected the
defendant's "Motion for Jail Time" on the basis that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The defendant appealed,
seeking credit for time spent in state custody on a related charge.
His motion was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3568, which states: "The
Attorney General shall give any such person [convicted of an
offense] credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent
in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sent-
ence was imposed.12 7 Acknowledging that giving credit is an
n, The Tenth Circuit's rationale for affirming the refusal to give the defendant's
instruction was based upon a series of events leading up to the willful injury of government
property. These included an officer in uniform showing an I.D. card to the defendant; the
officer's use of a radio; ample time for the defendant to observe the officer; and a lack of
hesitance on the part of the defendant in walking back to the patrol car with the officer.
The only evidence that supported the defendant's theory of defense was his own testimony
as to his subjective state of mind. The Tenth Circuit held that this was not enough, citing
United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hagen, 470 F.2d
110 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); and Beck v. United States, 305
F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
where the court held:
[Iln criminal cases the defendant is entitled to have presented instructions
relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the
evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent,
or of doubtful credibility. He is entitled to have such instructions even
though the sole testimony in support of the defense is his own.
Id. at 617. See United States v. Indian Trailer Corp., 226 F.2d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 1955).
See also United States v. Garcia, 452 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1971), where the court recognized
that the phrase "any foundation in the evidence" did not necessarily mean
that a requested charge encompass, in the trial judge's eyes, a believable or
sensible defense . . . .We hold that where the defendant's proposed charge
presents, when properly framed, a valid defense, and where there has been
some evidence relevant to that defense adduced at trial, then the trial judge
may not refuse to charge on that defense.
Id. at 423.
'" No. 75-1636 (10th Cir., Apr. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
-7 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
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administrative function, 8' the Tenth Circuit held that judicial
review was nonetheless appropriate "to insure compliance with
that section in order to protect a prisoner's statutory right to
credit." ' 9 Although the federal courts have varied the jurisdic-
tional bases utilized for entertaining such motions,9 0 the Tenth
Circuit has recognized the proper avenue for relief as 28 U.S.C. §
2255.91 Noting that the defendant's motion was properly filed
with the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to dismiss the motion for a lack of jurisdiction.
The issue on appeal in United States v. Marines22 was
whether the sentencing court gave improper consideration to a
felony charge, which had been dismissed as part of a plea bargain,
in imposing sentence for a misdemeanor charge based upon the
" In rationalizing the computation of sentencing as an administrative function, the
D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Lewis, 447 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stated that "[tihe
mandate and operative scheme implicit in the statute provides that the available credit
shall be applied after whatever sentence is imposed and not before sentence. Thus, the
court must first impose sentence before any 'credit' may be realized." Id. at 1265. See
Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973); Bostick v. United States, 409 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 890 (1969); Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968).
Due to the administrative character of the "Motion for Jail Time," most circuits have
held that the district court may refuse to entertain the motion where the appellant has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Pace v. Clark, 453 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d
386 (10th Cir. 1966).
' No. 75-1636 at 3. See United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970).
29o The Tenth Circuit recognized that federal courts have treated motions seeking
credit for time spent in state custody as falling under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) (addresses
the power of a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) (addresses the jurisdiction of federal district courts to entertain
actions "to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty"); and FED. R. CRiM.
P. 35 (a motion for reduction of sentence must be made within 120 days after the sentence
has been imposed). No. 75-1636 at 3. For an example of court discretion exercised in
treating these motions, see Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968), where the
Ninth Circuit held that justice required it to treat the appellant's "Motion for Jail Time"
as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in lieu of his actual petition under
FED. R. CalM. P. 35 where the motion was made five years after the sentence had been
imposed.
No. 75-1636 at 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states, in part: "A prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming. . . that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to . .. correct the sentence." See Davis v.
Willingham, 415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969). For other circuits that have recognized 28
U.S.C. § 2255 as a proper avenue for relief, see Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1970); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 400
F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967).
-7 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
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same set of facts. In concluding that the appellant's claim was
nonmeritorious, the Tenth Circuit recalled its consideration of a
similar issue in United States v. Majors:
29 3
[T]he dismissed indictment and the charge contained in it are
within the kind of information which a court may properly consider
in passing sentence. The plea bargain and the indictment dismissal
resulting from it did not and, indeed, could not, deprive the judge
of the right and probably the duty of giving consideration to it.2'
2. Prisoner's Rights
In Robinson v. McCune25 the appellant, while serving two
concurrent five-year felony sentences at a federal penitentiary,
was sentenced to two one-year misdemeanor sentences to run
concurrently with each other, but consecutively "to any sentence
now serving. '29 6 The issue arose as to whether the defendant
should have been transferred, at his request, to a lesser custody
institution for the service of his misdemeanor sentences following
the completion of his service of the felony sentences.27 Prison
authorities chose to aggregate the defendant's sentences whereby
he was to serve one sentence for all purposes, including place of
confinement. 28 The fact that one sentence was for a felony and
the other for a misdemeanor was disregarded.
The Tenth Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 4161 requires ag-
gregation of sentences for purposes of sentence computation. 299
However, the court also acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 4083 had
been amended in 1959 to permit incarceration at a penitentiary
only if the offense was punishable by a sentence in excess of one
year.300 In reversing the trial court with respect to the issue of
-3 490 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975). See Overview,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 52 DEN. L.J. 133, 159-61 (1975).
114 535 F.2d at 554.
" 536 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 1341.
The appellant claimed that he was being unlawfully confined in the penitentiary,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1970), to serve sentences imposed for misdemeanor
convictions. This provision provides, in part: "A sentence for an offense punishable by
imprisonment for one year or less shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent
of the defendant."
"1 536 F.2d at 1341.
2- 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970) provides, in part: "When two or more consecutive sent-
ences are to be served, the aggregate of the several sentences shall be the basis upon which
the [good time allowance] shall be computed."
536 F.2d at 1342.
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place of confinement, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the
practice of aggregating consecutive misdemeanor sentences with
prior unexpired felony sentences for purposes of determining
place of confinement is not only unauthorized under § 4161, but
also does substantial violence to the clear legislative intent ex-
pressed in § 4083."3 °0 In accordance with this interpretation, the
court held that Robinson could not be "compelled to serve the
misdemeanor sentences at a penitentiary, in the absence of his
consent." 0
2
In United States v. Williams303 the limits imposed on a fed-
eral prisoner's right to privacy were challenged where the defen-
dant filed a motion to suppress evidence that was seized as the
result of a rectal search that had been performed prior to releasing
the defendant to a Deputy Marshal.30 The Tenth Circuit con-
firmed the trial court's overruling of the defendant's motion, not-
ing that the authority for the search was based upon 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4041 and 4042 which grant authority to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons to promulgate policies and procedures for the
treatment of inmates.305 In defining the court's scope of review in
these matters, the Tenth Circuit stated that "judicial review will
be granted only upon a showing that prison officials have exer-
cised their discretionary powers in such a manner as to constitute
I' ld. See also Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4 (1923); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
536 F.2d at 1392. See Dorssart v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
United States v. Lomas, 60 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
No. 75-1401 (10th Cir., Apr. 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'' The defendant was to be placed in the custody of a deputy United States marshal
for the purpose of transporting the defendant to a trial wherein he was to appear as a
witness. Prior to the defendant's release, permission was granted by the warden to conduct
the challenged rectal search wherein a plastic container, containing a piece of hacksaw
blade, an emery cord, two screwdrivers, and a small piece of metal, was discovered.
I The Tenth Circuit recognized that pursuant to these statutory provisions, "prison
authorities at the various institutions are authorized to formulate policies and procedures
necessary to meet the particular needs of the respective institutions." No. 75-1401 at 5.
The following policy statement was issued by the Warden of Leavenworth in March 1974:
Every inmate will be searched thoroughly with a magnetometer to detect any
contraband hidden in body cavities. A more thorough rectal examination will
normally only be necessary in those cases when a positive reading is received
from the magnetometer search, or when a Deputy U.S. Marshal or the Chief
Correctional Supervisor or his designee determines the inmate is a serious
escape risk or is extremely dangerous.
Id. There was evidence that the correctional supervisor at Leavenworth considered the
defendant to be a serious escape risk. Id.
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clear abuse or caprice." 06 The appellant failed to make such a
showing.
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a)
Three separate cases, United States v. Katz,' 7 United States
v. Ratley,30 8 and United States v. Pauldino,30 1 presented the issue
of whether, because of the method of their appointments, special
attorneys appointed under section 515(a) 310 possessed proper au-
thorization to appear before grand juries. Appellant Ratley con-
tended that "the letters commissioning the attorneys were impro-
per in that they did not 'specifically direct' 31' the attorneys' activ-
ities and were not issued by the United States Attorney General
himself. '312 Recognizing that recent decisions of other circuits
had specifically rejected these arguments, the Tenth Circuit held
Id. See Rivera v. Toft, 477 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d
292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973); Black v. Warden, United States Peniten-
tiary, 467 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1972); Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 944 (1972).
- 535 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1976).
3" No. 75-1403 (10th Cir., Apr. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
3" No. 75-1336 (10th Cir., Mar. 17, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
i,' Section 515(a) provides that:
The Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice, or
any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may,
when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any legal pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings .. .which
United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not
he is a resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.
31, No. 75-1403 at 3. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975) (broad authority to
Strike Force attorney under commission signed by Assistant Attorney General). The
Second Circuit states: "The 'specifically directed' phrase of § 515(a) should not be so
niggardly construed as to interfere with the federal government's ability to efficiently
administer its criminal laws." 522 F.2d at 64.
312 No. 75-1403 at 3.
3 DiGirlomo v. United States, 520 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975); Infelice v. United States, 528 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1975). See United States v. Agrusa, 520 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1975), wherein the court
held that under § 515(a) the Attorney General could delegate his authority to subordinate
officers of the Department of Justice. In United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.
1975), the Eighth Circuit rejected the position of the Second Circuit in Persico "that the
power of the Attorney General to authorize special attorneys to appear before grand juries
is limited to situations where there is a special reason to limit the role of the local district
attorney and where that reason has been made explicit by the Attorney General." 520 F.2d
at 368 n.11 (citing Persico, 522 F.2d at 60).
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that the special attorneys in each case" 4 had proper authority to
appear before the grand juries. 15
B. 18 US.C. § 1952
In United States v. Villano316 appellants Villano and Smal-
done appealed their convictions under section 19521'1 on the
ground that the evidence adduced at trial was of a local gambling
business patronized sporadically by one nonresidentl 8 and, thus,
under the reasoning of Rewis v. United States,"' their activities
did not constitute a federal offense.32 0 In upholding the convic-
tions, the Tenth Circuit determined that the evidence supported
the convictions based upon (1) an interpretation of the statute, 32 '
5, No. 75-1336 at 4; No. 75-1403 at 3; 535 F.2d at 595-96.
3, See note 314 supra.
31 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
, 529 F.2d at 1052. The Travel Act provisions in question provide that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling ....
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
- The appellants' employees, Colgan and Amato, over the telephone in Denver,
Colorado, accepted bets for appellants' .illegal gambling operation. The evidence of inter-
state telephone calls came from one Ferris, a resident of Valentine, Nebraska, who testi-
fied that he placed bets by calling three Denver telephone numbers and by using a code
number. Ferris' testimony was corroborated by telephone company records. United States
v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1050-51.
31 401 U.S. 808 (1971). The Tenth Circuit gave the following summary of the Rewis
case:
In Rewis there was a lottery or numbers operation in Florida near the
Georgia line. Two defendants were Florida residents and there was no proof
that they crossed state lines in connection with operation of their lottery.
Two other defendants were Georgia residents who traveled to the Florida
location to place bets.
529 F.2d at 1052.
' 529 F.2d at 1052.
3' The court stated:
From the terms of the statute itself we feel that the evidence supports the
convictions. There was proof to sustain an inference that the defendants
caused or aided and abetted the use by Colgan and Amato of interstate
telephone facilities in furnishing line information, accepting bets and arrang-
ing payoffs with Ferris.
1977
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(2) an examination of its legislative history, 32 2 and (3) an analysis
of the Rewis opinion. 32 The court stated that a plausible argu-
ment for reversal might have been made on the basis of United
States v. Altobello324 and United States v. McCormick, 321 but held
the two cases inapplicable here because of the repeated use of an
interstate facility by the nonresident witness which produced a
substantial volume of gambling on his part.
32 6
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2042
United States v. 17,400 Dollars in Currency 327 presented the
Tenth Circuit with a unique claim to monies given to a
"cooperating individual, 3 28 Nocenti, by his principals and used
to set up an illegal narcotics transaction.3 29 After his principals
were arrested and subsequently convicted, Nocenti filed a claim
for the money which he had turned over to the Bureau of Narcot-
ics and Dangerous Drugs.
330
' Id. The Tenth Circuit cited the reasoning and conclusion of the Supreme Court in
Rewis for the proposition that, based on its legislative history, the Travel Act was aimed
at organized crime and persons residing in one state while operating illegal gambling in
another state. The Act does not apply to illegal activity solely because that activity is
patronized by out-of-state customers. Id. (citing United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811-
12). See note 319 supra. The court further summarized the Act's legislative history to the
effect that Congress intended "use [of] any facility" to apply to interstate telephone
calls. United States v. Villano, 533 F.2d at 1052-53 n.6.
" The Tenth Circuit distinguished Rewis, noting that the Supreme Court's decision
focused on the interstate activity of others. 529 F.2d at 1053. In Villano it was "the
defendants [who] situated their agents where they carried on transactions using tele-
phones, receiving local and interstate calls." Id. (emphasis in original). See also United
States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987, 992 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976).
324 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971) (incidental involvement of interstate facilities).
3- 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d at 992;
United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wechs-
ler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
3 United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1053-54. The Fourth Circuit, for purposes of
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the Act, examines whether there has been any
use of an interstate facility in furtherance of one of the illegal activities defined in the Act.
See United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); and United States v.
Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
32 524 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir. 1975). The case is an offshoot of the criminal prosecution
reported in United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1974).
321 524 F.2d at 1105. The court's decision indicates that Nocenti was operating with
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The majority of the court held that the money must be sur-
rendered to Nocenti because of the agency relationships involved:
Nocenti, as agent of two principals who were involved in a serious
crime, was no longer required to account for the money,33' and
Nocenti, as an informer, was not an agent of the United States.
3 32
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle argued that, through-
out the transaction, which was for the purpose of arresting and
convicting Nocenti's two "principals," Smaldone and Merkow-
itz,33 Nocenti was really acting on behalf of the United States
Government, not on behalf of Smaldone and Merkowitz or on his
own behalf.3 3 Thus, in concluding that Nocenti was acting as a
government agent and that, therefore, "the government has a
better right [to the money] than Nocenti, ''1 3 Judge Doyle indi-
cated that 28 U.S.C. § 2042336 should govern how the money is
treated: Nocenti should have been required to prove independent
good title; were he not able to do so, the money would be inherited
by the United States Treasury.n? Judge Doyle further stated:
3' Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 412(2)(b) (1958)).
33 The majority found no case "where the government has formally or informally
asserted that an informer was a lawful agent of the United States or has accepted responsi-
bility for the actions of an informer as his principal." 524 F.2d at 1106. It argued, by
analogy, that the Government has consistently refused to accept responsibility for the
actions of informers in entrapment cases. Id. See United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). But see 524 F.2d at 1107 (Doyle, J., dissent-
ing) (wherein it is argued that the entrapment cases recognize an agency, imputing the
acts of the informant to the Government).
524 F.2d at 1107. According to Judge Doyle, the evidence indicated that Nocenti
journeyed to Peru with the money for one purpose-to bring back some cocaine that could
be used to arrest and convict Smaldone and Merkowitz. Id.
334 Id.
I Id. at 1108.
3m This section provides:
No money deposited shall be withdrawn except by order of court.
In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited in court
has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and such money has remained so
deposited for at least five years unclaimed by the person entitled thereto,
such court shall cause such money to be deposited in the Treasury in the
name and to the credit of the United States. Any claimant entitled to any
such money may, on petition to the court and upon notice to the United
States attorney and full proof of the right thereto, obtain an order directing
payment to him.
28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1970).
"I It is Judge Doyle's position that Nocenti, as a government informer, should have
been compensated in accordance with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970), "which [under 21 U.S.C. § 886(a)]
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"The really objectionable aspect to me is that the court is lending
its aid to one who has no legal right to the award but, more
important, the court is going to the assistance of a wrongdoer-a
converter."
3 1
D. 18 U.S.C. § 2518
The appellant in United States v. Russo 39 alleged error in the
trial court's failure to suppress wiretap evidence 34 arguing that,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, 3 ' the wiretap orders and applications
therefor were deficient.342 In an opinion written by Judge McWil-
liams, the Tenth Circuit held that, based on an analysis of the
wiretap applications34 3 and United States v. Kahn, 344 the evidence
was sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause which would
authorizes the Attorney General to pay an informer such sum or sums of money as he may
deem appropriate." 524 F.2d at 1109.
13 524 F.2d at 1109.
339 527 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). Defendant Russo
was convicted of conspiring to carry on prostitution and bribery in Kansas [violation of
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3512, -3513, and -3901 (1970)] through the use of interstate facilities
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). Id. at 1053.
Russo's telephone conversations with a co-conspirator, Lowman, were intercepted
by wiretaps placed on the telephones at the two massage parlors operated by Lowman.
Id. at 1054. The court's opinion indicated that there were five tapes of Russo's calls to
the target telephone which were introduced into evidence at his trial. Id. at 1057-58.
I" Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (1970).
312 The application for a wiretap and the order authorizing the same must include
"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(IV) (1970) (emphasis added). It was
Russo's position on appeal that, since he was not so identified, the wiretaps should have
been suppressed. 527 F.2d at 1054.
113 The first application for the wiretap named Lowman and "others as yet unknown."
527 F.2d at 1054. Russo's name was mentioned in the FBI agent's affidavit in support of
the application.
The first application for extension of the wiretap did not include the appellant's name
although Russo's name was again mentioned in the affidavit supporting the application
for the second extension. The court's decision indicates that phone calls from one "Tony"
(later identified as Russo) were intercepted after the first order was granted and between
the first and second extensions. Id. at 1054-55.
3' 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The Tenth Circuit in Russo stated:
The rule that we glean from Kahn is that if the Government "knows,"
i.e., has "probable cause" to believe, that a particular person is committing
an offense for which the wiretap is sought, and also "knows" that such
individual is likely to use the target telephone in furtherance of such criminal
activity, then, and only then, need the application and order for a wiretap
identify such person by name.
527 F.2d at 1056.
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have necessitated the identification of appellant Russo in the
wiretap applications and order.34 In addition, the court con-





DENYING A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY
TO CALL A WITNESS WHO WILL INVOKE HIS FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
During the most recent survey period the Tenth Circuit de-
cided two cases' which involved the attempt by criminal defen-
dants to raise inferences favorable to their cases by calling wit-
nesses who would assert the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 2 The defendants in each case were prosecuted
on charges related to the illegal distribution of drugs and in their
defense sought to call as witnesses individuals who had been pres-
ent at the alleged drug sales. In each case, the Tenth Circuit
"1 527 F.2d at 1056. The court based its finding of no probable cause on a peculiar
factual aspect of the case, i.e., that Russo's name, although mentioned in the application
affidavits, was brought into the matter purely by double hearsay (an informant told the
FBI that Lowman had told him (informant) that Russo was a conduit for his (Lowman's)
protection money to the police). Id. at 1054. The court determined that this hearsay was
insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. Id. Compare United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
36 527 F.2d at 1057-58. Even though conversations by Russo were intercepted before
the first and second wiretap extension applications and orders, the Tenth Circuit also
determined that their content was innocuous, e.g., that the conversations did not give any
evidence of prostitution, bribery, or interstate travel. Id. at 1057.
1 United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 979 (1976); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485
(10th Cir. 1975).
2 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No person . . .




affirmed the refusal of the district court to allow defense counsel
to cause the witnesses to invoke their fifth amendment privilege
in the presence of the jury.
Two constitutional issues were raised by the defendants on
appeal. Both defendants argued that the nature of a witness' fifth
amendment right required that the witness be compelled to in-
voke his privilege on the stand in the presence of the jury.' In
addition, one of the defendants argued that the action of the trial
court denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' The Tenth Circuit did
not directly address either constitutional issue. Instead, it de-
cided both cases on the basis of an evidentiary rationale used by
other circuits in factually analogous situations.5
This paper will discuss the fifth and sixth amendment issues
which the Tenth Circuit did not confront, and evaluate the
soundness of the evidentiary rationale used by the Tenth Circuit
in deciding the cases.
I. FACTS
A. United States v. Martin
Maurice Duke Martin was tried and convicted of two sepa-
rate counts of distributing heroin.6 The Government's primary
witness was an undercover agent for the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) who testified that he purchased heroin from
Martin on two different occasions.7 The only other person present
at the alleged sales was an informant who had originally intro-
duced the DEA agent to Martin.' At the defendant's first trial the
informant was subpoenaed by the defendant; the informant took
the stand in front of the jury but refused to testify on the grounds
Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975);
Brief for Appellant at 11-13, United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 at 7.
See text accompanying notes 57-74 infra.
Martin was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
A second DEA agent testified that he had observed the other agent make contact
with Martin on both occasions, but that he did not see the sale take place. 526 F.2d at
486. Therefore, the jury based its decision almost entirely on the testimony of the one
agent.
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that under the fifth amendment he could not be compelled to
incriminate himself.' The trial ended with a hung jury.0
At his second trial Martin again caused a subpoena to be
served on the informant. The informant appeared at the trial, but
informed defense counsel that he would again refuse to testify.
Martin's attorney nevertheless attempted to put the informant on
the stand." The trial court refused to allow the witness to be
called, and later gave a neutralizing instruction admonishing the
jury to draw no inferences from the fact that the informant had
not appeared as a witness.
2
On appeal Martin argued that the trial court committed re-
versible error in refusing to allow him to call the informant. 3 He
maintained that a witness, in contrast to a defendant, had no
constitutional right not to take the stand. 4 Martin argued that a
witness' testimonial privilege against self-incrimination could not
be triggered until a question was put to the witness after he had
been sworn and placed before the jury."
B. United States v. Eitel
Jeffrey Eitel was indicted and convicted of distributing and




2 The trial court gave the following instruction:
There has been testimony in this case about an informant named Samuel
Hudson. As a result of a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the
Court has determined that Mr. Hudson is not available to be called as a
witness by either side in this case.
The jury may not draw any inference from the fact that Samuel Hudson
did not appear as a witness in this case.
Id.
Id Id. at 487.
", Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975).
I d.
Eitel was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). At
Eitel's trial a DEA agent testified that he went to a certain Denver residence to negotiate
a purchase of methamphetamine. Eitel arrived a short time later and produced a sample.
The agent then demanded to see the entire quantity of methamphetamine before making
the purchase. At this point Eitel and Marcel Targa, who had been present throughout the
transaction, left the room. According to the agent, they returned accompanied by Owen
Plyler, were shown the purchase money, and again departed. Eitel, Targa, and Plyler soon
returned and, according to the agent's testimony, Targa gave the agent several packets
containing what was later identified as methamphetamine. No. 75-1537 at 3-4.
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Eitel attempted to call Owen Plyler, who was present at the
alleged sale, as a witness. 7 Out of the presence of the jury, the
court questioned Plyler concerning his intent to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege and allowed Eitel's counsel to ask Plyler
specific questions. Plyler asserted his testimonial privilege to
each question."8 After determining that Plyler had a legitimate
right to invoke the privilege and being assured that he would
stand on his privilege, the court refused to allow Plyler to be
examined in the jury's presence."
On appeal Eitel, like Martin, argued that a witness' privilege
against self-incrimination involves a limited option of refusal to
testify and not a prohibition against all inquiry. He asserted as
error the trial court's refusal to allow Plyler to be called as a
witness. 0 In addition, Eitel argued that the trial court's refusal
denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor."'
II. HOLDING
A. United States v. Martin
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the issue raised by
Martin concerning the boundaries of a witness' fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court limited its sub-
stantive discussion to distinguishing United States v. Namet2
and United States v. Coppola3 from Martin. Both Namet and
Coppola were relied upon by the defense as supportive of the
proposition that a person can invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege only in the presence of the jury after being called as a witness
and being placed under oath. 4 In addition, the court relied on
11 On cross-examination the undercover agent admitted that he had stated in the
complaint affidavit filed three months after the alleged transaction that it was Owen
Plyler, and not Eitel, who produced the original sample of methamphetamine. Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Charges arising out of the incident were still pending against Plyler but would be
dismissed if Plyler satisfactorily completed a treatment program he was then undergoing.
Id. at 4 n.1.
0 Brief for Appellant at 11-13, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
* No. 75-1537 at 7.
373 U.S. 179 (1963).
23 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 Namet and Coppola involved attempts by prosecutors to raise inferences adverse
to a defendant by calling witnesses who then invoked their fifth amendment right in front
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decisions from other circuits sustaining a trial court's refusal to
allow a defense witness to be called in similar circumstances. 5
The Tenth Circuit disposed of Namet by distinguishing it
factually." Without discussing the explicit language in Coppola
that lent support to Martin's argument,27 the court observed that
both Coppola and Namet really stood for the evidentiary proposi-
tion that the prosecution should not be allowed to ask questions
certain to produce a claim of privilege and with it an atmosphere
of guilt." The court reasoned that both Coppola and Namet ac-
tually stood for the proposition that a defendant should not be
allowed to use the same tactic to produce an atmosphere of inno-
cence.
B. United States v. Eitel
In the Eitel decision, the court did not attempt to define the
scope of a witness' fifth amendment right nor did the court dis-
cuss the issue raised by Eitel concerning his sixth amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.29
of the jury. In Namet, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim
that reversible error occurred when a prosecutor was allowed to call witnesses who then
invoked their testimonial privilege. The Court stated several reasons for its holding: First,
the prosecutor honestly believed the witnesses did not have a legitimate right to claim the
privilege and therefore no prosecutorial misconduct was involved; second, the witnesses
gave considerable nonprivileged testimony that corroborated the Government's case; fi-
nally, the few claims of privilege did not add critical weight to the Government's case but
at most constituted cumulative support for inferences already well established by the
nonprivileged portion of the testimony of the witnesses. 373 U.S. at 186-89.
In Coppola, the Tenth Circuit read Namet as supportive of the proposition "that the
privilege is not a prohibition against inquiry and cannot be effectively raised before the
question is asked and is applicable only to particular questions." 479 F.2d at 1160. Never-
theless, the court in Coppola found that reversible error had occurred, holding that the
conduct of the Government fell within that part of the Namet opinion prohibiting the
conscious efforts by a prosecutor to raise inferences adverse to the defendant from a
witness' claiming the self-incrimination privilege.
" United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); Bowles v. United States,
439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
" After briefly reiterating the facts and holding of Namet, the court stated: "In thus
holding the Court observed that no constitutional issues were involved, only a claim of
'evidentiary trial error.' This observation is equally applicable to the present case. Namet,
then, is clearly distinguishable on the facts." 526 F.2d at 487.
See note 24 supra.
526 F.2d at 487.
The only reference in the opinion indicating the court had given any consideration
to Eitel's sixth amendment claim occurred in a footnote. Therein the Tenth Circuit indi-
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Instead, the court again relied on authorities in other circuits that
had confronted similar factual situations. 0 Specifically, the court
adopted the evidentiary rationale stated by the majority opinion
in Bowles v. United States:3'
It is well settled that the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences
from the decision of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege
whether those inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the de-
fense. The rule is grounded not only in the constitutional notion that
guilt may not be inferred from the exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege but also in the danger that a witness' invoking the Fifth
Amendment in the presence of the jury will have a disproportionate
impact on their deliberations. The jury may think it high courtroom
drama of probative significance when a witness "takes the Fifth."
In reality the probative value of the event is almost entirely under-
cut by the absence of any requirement that the witness justify his
fear of incrimination and by the fact that it is a form of evidence
not subject to cross-examination.2
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Boundaries of a Witness' Fifth Amendment Privilege
There is considerable authority for the proposition relied on
by both Martin and Eitel that a witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege, unlike that of a defendant, does not give a witness the right
to refuse to be called to the stand.3 According to this notion, the
privilege of the witness, as opposed to that of a defendant, is
merely an option of refusal and not a prohibition against all in-
cated that it had examined the dissenting opinions in Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d
536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971), and United States v. Beye, 445
F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971), but found the majority opinions more convincing. No. 75-1537
at 7 n.2. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinion in those two cases, see
text accompanying notes 57-65 and 75-79 infra.
11 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971). In addition to the cases cited in Martin, the court in Eitel
relied on United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971).
31 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
3'2 439 F.2d at 541 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Tenth Circuit did not articu-
late a rule absolutely proscribing a trial court from ever allowing a witness to be called
by the defense in this kind of situation. However, while leaving the ultimate decision to
the sound discretion of the trial court, the Tenth Circuit gave no indication of the factors
a lower court should consider in making its decision.
33 See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDNCE § 136 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2268
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); and authorities cited in note 34 infra.
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quiry. Thus, the privilege requires that questions normally be put
to a witness on the stand while he is under oath. 4
The reason for requiring that witnesses actually submit to
questioning before asserting the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination arises from the nature of the privilege
itself. The privilege is available only if a particular response falls
within the narrow scope of the privilege's protection. 35 Because
the judge, and not the witness, is the ultimate arbiter of this
question, a decision on the propriety of allowing the witness to
assert the privilege cannot be made until the question has been
put to the witness and he has stated the basis for his refusal to
answer.
31
If one accepts this rationale, it does not necessarily follow
that a witness should be required to assert his privilege before the
jury. If the purpose of requiring the witness to take the stand is
to insure that the privilege is not improperly used, that goal can
be accomplished in an in camera hearing out of the jury's pres-
ence. This is precisely the procedure suggested by several courts
that have faced the problem in situations similar to that found
in Martin and Eitel. 37 It is also the procedure followed by the trial
11 The cases articulating this rule tend to fall into three factually distinct categories.
First, there is a group of cases involving criminal trials where the rule is stated as dictum.
See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976);
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971); People v. Hannon, 50 Misc. 2d
297, 270 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1962). Second, there are cases involving witnesses called before a
grand jury or other investigative body with subpoena powers. See, e.g., Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); United States v. Cefalu, 338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964).
Finally, there are cases in which a prosecutor has called a witness and the witness has
stood on his fifth amendment privilege before the jury. United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Marcello v.
United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952); Commonwealth v. Donatelli, 202 Pa. Super.
565, 198 A.2d 338 (1964). The precedential value of the last two groups of cases is weakened
by the factual differences between these situations and the situations found in Eitel and
Martin. Moreover, when analyzed in terms of the rule's rationale, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 35-39 infra, the unqualified statement of the rule found in these cases
becomes highly suspect.
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDENCE § 136 (1972).
Id. In addition to making certain that the witness has a legitimate right to invoke
the privilege, requiring the witness to take the stand and plead his fifth amendment
privilege while under oath after specific questions have been put to him arguably serves
the additional purpose of testing the witness' resolve to stand on the privilege.
37 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
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court in Eitel, and implicitly approved by the Tenth Circuit."
Absent an in camera hearing similar to the one held by the
trial court in Eitel,35 where the witness' privilege is actually put
to the test, the rule and its rationale should control. The trial
court in Martin arguably erred to the extent that it failed to
conduct a hearing of this sort.
B. A Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory
Process
The sixth amendment guarantees to every criminal defen-
dant the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses to testify
at his trial." This right was made applicable to state criminal
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment in Washington v.
Texas. 4
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "few
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own behalf." 2 However, the right is not absolute.
In Chambers v. Mississippi43 the Court made it explicitly clear
that "in exercising this right the accused must comply with es-
tablished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence."44 More recently, in United States v. Nobles,45 the Court
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
No. 75-1537 at 9.
" See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
" The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For further discussion of this case, see notes 66-68 infra.
1 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (citations omitted).
'3 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers the defendant sought to introduce the testimony
of three persons to whom another, McDonald, had confessed to having committed the
murder for which Chambers was being tried. The trial court excluded the evidence as
hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed and noted that, in this situation, the hearsay bore
the assurances of trustworthiness and also fell within the traditional exception for declara-
tions against interest. The Court then went on to say: "That testimony also was critical
to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affect-
ing the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied me-
chanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Id. at 302.
I /d.
422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles the defendant attempted to impeach the credibility
of a government witness by using statements obtained from the witness by a defense
investigator. When defense counsel indicated he did not intend to produce the investiga-
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reaffirmed this qualifying language, noting that "[tihe Sixth
Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free
from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system . . .,.
Implicit in the holdings of these cases is the recognition that the
Supreme Court has accorded to the rules of evidence and also to
discretionary evidentiary rulings a constitutional dimension cap-
able of overriding an express constitutional guarantee.
Only two circuit court decisions have directly addressed the
sixth amendment issue raised by Eitel in a factually analogous
context.4 Neither case was cited by the Tenth Circuit. In Myers
v. Frye"5 the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that
he should be allowed to have a witness invoke the fifth amend-
ment before the jury. The court held that "[t]he Sixth Amend-
ment does not operate to prevent a state from adopting any limi-
tations on defense evidence in criminal trials, but only prevents
the adoption of broad arbitrary limitations." 9 The court saw the
refusal to allow the defendant to call the witness as neither broad
nor arbitrary." In United States v. Roberts5 the Ninth Circuit
said that the sixth amendment right "must be considered in light
of its purpose, namely, to produce testimony."" Since the wit-
ness' refusal to testify would not be testimonial in the literal sense
of that word, calling a witness who would refuse to testify did not
fulfill that purpose.53
tor's complete report, the trial court ruled that the investigator could not testify concern-
ing his interviews with the witness. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that the disclosure condition was improper. The Supreme Court then reversed the court
of appeals. In the decision, the Court rejected the defendant's sixth amendment claim,
and held that the evidentiary ruling was within the trial court's discretion in order to
assure that the jury would hear the full testimony from the investigator rather than only
a truncated portion favorable to the defendant. Id. at 240-41.
' Id. at 241.
17 United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113
(1975); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968). For other courts that have spoken to
the scope of the right in other contexts, see Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d
1126 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. De Stefano, 476 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973). Several
other circuit courts have implicitly rejected Eitel's sixth amendment argument. See note
30 supra.
' 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 21.
'- Id.
503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).




Other circuits that have faced the kind of situation presented
by Eitel and Martin have side-stepped the sixth amendment
issue entirely.54 Rather than confront the difficult constitutional
question posed by this kind of situation, they have relied on a
purely evidentiary rationale, refusing to acknowledge that the
rationale itself had constitutional dimensions. 5
C. The Evidentiary Rationale
The reasoning adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and
Eitel accurately reflects the approach to this problem taken by
the courts generally. The focus is not on the defendant's sixth
amendment right, nor on the extent of a witness' fifth amend-
ment privilege; rather, the primary concern is with the eviden-
tiary ramifications of allowing inferences to be drawn by a jury
from the assertion by a witness of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
This evidentiary rationale was succinctly stated in that por-
tion of the majority opinion in Bowles v. United States5 quoted
by the Tenth Circuit in Eitel.57 This evidentiary concern seems
to involve three elements: the "constitutional notion" that guilt
should not be inferred from the exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege; the inability to subject the evidence to cross-
examination; 5 and the potential danger of a jury giving undue
probative significance to a witness' pleading the fifth amend-
ment.
The first element, the "constitutional notion" referred to by
the majority in Bowles, really has no application to a witness, as
opposed to a defendant, asserting the fifth amendment privi-
lege. 9 Since the witness is not on trial, his constitutional right to
remain silent is not endangered by requiring him to take the
stand or by allowing the jury to draw inferences from his silence.60
4 See note 30 supra.
'1 See note 26 supra.
- 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
s See text accompanying note 31 supra.
For an excellent analysis of the majority opinion in Bowles, see Comment, An
Extension of the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination, 52 B.U.L. Rlv. 149
(1972).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 157.
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Similarly, the inability to subject this kind of evidence to
direct cross-examination should not be accorded undue weight."
In the first place, the prosecutor will be able to appeal to the
jurors' natural skepticism of any attempt on the part of the ac-
cused to place the blame on another. 2 He will also be able to
impeach the silent witness by raising inferences concerning the
possibility of undue influence or ulterior motives . 3 In addition,
in the context of a criminal proceeding it does not necessarily
follow that the Government's right to cross-examine should be
deemed paramount to the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess. 4 Where the two rights cannot be accommodated in the con-
text of a criminal trial involving a defendant clothed with the
traditional protections of an accused, the balance arguably falls
in favor of permitting the defendant to raise the inference for
whatever value it might possess. 5
The third element, which involves a combined concern with
the unreliability of the inferences and potential prejudice to the
prosecutor, would seem to be the crux of the rationale. Since the
courts have allowed this evidentiary concern to effectively over-
ride the defendant's sixth amendment right to present witnesses
in his own behalf, a careful analysis of this aspect of the rationale
is necessary.
In Washington v. Texas,66 the Supreme Court held that if a
defense witness' testimony is relevant and material, it should be
admitted. 7 Unless the evidence can be excluded for some legiti-
6, Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 545 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
:2 439 F.2d at 545 n.13.
63 Id.
64 United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissent-
ing).
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 121 at 256 n.77 (1972).
66 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
67 Washington involved the attempt of a defendant to call as a witness another indi-
vidual who had already been convicted of the same crime. Texas statutes proscribed this
practice. TEx. REv. CODE ANN. art. 82 (1925) (repealed 1967); TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN.
art. 711 (1925) (repealed 1965). The Court formulated the issue of the case to be "whether
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put
his witnesses on the stand, as well as the right to compel their attendance in court." 388
U.S. at 19. After noting that the right to offer the testimony of witnesses is the right to
present a defense and is therefore a fundamental element of due process of law, Chief
Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
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mate reason, refusing to admit relevant and material evidence
violates a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process."
In order for evidence to be considered relevant and material
for the purposes of admissibility it does not have be be completely
free from alternative interpretations; it is only necessary that the
evidence tend to increase the likelihood of the defendant's guilt
or innocence. 9 The inferences to be drawn from a witness' plead-
ing the fifth amendment clearly meet this test.7 0 Consequently,
if a court refuses to allow an accused to call a witness solely
because it believes the inferences to be drawn by the jury from
that evidence are unreliable or ambiguous, in the sense that more
than one logical inference follows from the invocation of the privi-
lege, the court would be disallowing relevant and material testi-
mony in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right.
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had person-
ally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material
to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit
the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. The judgment of convic-
tion must be reversed.
Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
The Court also stated in a footnote that: "Nothing in this opinion should be construed
as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination
..... "Id. at 23 n.21. At least one court has interpreted this to mean that if the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right directly conflicts with a witness' fifth amendment right, the
former must give way to the latter. In other words, a witness cannot be forced to incrimi-
nate himself because his testimony would be relevant and material to the defendant's
defense. Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482
F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973).
11 See notes 43-45 and 67 supra.
'9 C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 38
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1940). See Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908), where
the Court stated:
The competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate
argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it
may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though remotely,
to a determination probably founded in truth.
Id. at 451 (citing Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 164 (1892)).
10 The probative value of such inferences has generally been conceded. See United
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959); Comment, Exercise of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the
Accused, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 151, 159 (1965).
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The issue of relevancy and materiality was effectively con-
ceded by the Bowles majority in their formulation of the problem.
The primary concern of the majority was not that the inferences
were lacking in probative value, but that the jury might accord
these very logical inferences undue weight.7 Thus, the court's real
concern was with the potential prejudicial effect to the prosecu-
torial function in allowing the evidence. This concern with preju-
dice, as distinguished from unreliability, arguably saves the ra-
tionale from the constitutional dilemma posed by Washington.7 2
If the potential for prejudice is significant, this danger protects a
court that excludes the evidence from the charge of arbitrariness
condemned in Washington.73 However, even if the court disallows
the evidence on this basis, it is according greater weight to the
possibility of prejudice to the prosecutor than to the defendant's
constitutional right to present relevant and material evidence in
his defense. This result can only be justified if the danger of
prejudice is very great, and a court should indulge in a very care-
ful consideration of the comparative constitutional values in-
volved.
The courts have not dealt with the difficult tension that ex-
ists between an evidentiary concern with potential prejudice to
the prosecutor and the defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence in his defense. Instead, the Bowles court and its progeny
have approached and resolved the problem by analogizing to pre-
cedents dealing with a fundamentally different situation-
prosecutorial attempts to raise inferences adverse to a defendant
by having a government witness stand on his fifth amendment
rights in the presence of the jury.7"
D. The Prosecutorial Precedents
A fundamental weakness in the majority's analysis in
Bowles, as adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and Eitel, is
the reliance upon precedents involving prosecutorial attempts to
"' See text accompanying note 32 supra.
72 See note 67 supra.
13 See note 67 supra.
1, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1964); Billeci v.




use this kind of evidence.75 Chief Justice Bazelon rightly pointed
out in his dissent in Bowles that the reasoning of these cases did
not necessarily apply to a situation in which it is the defense, and
not the prosecutor, that is attempting to raise the inferences." In
this situation the defendant is merely attempting to use the
other's refusal to testify as corroboration for other evidence pre-
sented in his defense." When the prosecutor uses this tactic it is
equivalent to an outright denial of the defendant's fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent because it is equivalent to using the
defendant's own silence as an element of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 8 By contrast, when an accused suggests by inference
that another person is culpable, no equivalent right residing in
the prosecutor is impinged, unless the threat of prejudice is
deemed sufficiently great to trigger the due process protections
discussed earlier.
79
The two situations are simply not analogous. But rather than
abandon the analogy with all its inappropriate analytical bag-
gage, the courts have steadfastly refused to engage the difficult
constitutional and evidentiary questions that lurk beneath its
simple symmetry.
71 See note 74 supra.
76 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971). Judge Bazelon stated: "The position of a defendant asserting his Sixth Amend-
ment right to bring witnesses before the jury is not analogous to that of a prosecutor
attempting to insinuate that a defendant is guilty because his confederates refuse to
answer incriminating questions." 439 F.2d at 545 n.11.
7 Id.
79 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra. In People v. Dikeman, 555 P.2d 519
(Colo. 1976), the Colorado Supreme Court faced essentially the same situation that the
Tenth Circuit confronted in Martin and Eitel. The defendant sought to call a witness who
had originally been charged with first degree assault arising out of the same shooting that
led to the defendant's indictment. However, prior to the trial, the charges against the
witness were dismissed for lack of probable cause. The defendant maintained that it was
the witness who had in fact committed the assault.
Knowing that the witness would stand on his fifth amendment right, and over the
objection of the prosecutor, the trial court permitted the defendant to call the witness and
cause him to invoke his testimonial privilege before the jury. The jury subsequently
acquitted the defendant.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court. Following the established ap-
proach, the court analogized to precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to use this
kind of evidence. According to the court, consistency required that the defendant and
prosecutor be treated alike. Without articulating it in these precise terms, the underlying
rationale seemed to involve the recognition of something akin to a right of due process
residing in the prosecutor.
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Martin and Eitel are most
susceptible to criticism for their failure squarely to confront the
fifth and sixth amendment issues raised by these appellants. By
relying on decisions that had in turn relied on and analogized to
precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to raise inferences
adverse to a defendant, the court compounded its error.
A defendant's attempt to raise inferences in his own favor by
calling a witness he knows will stand on his fifth amendment
privilege does involve an evidentiary problem. Accordingly, it was
not entirely inappropriate for the court to focus on this eviden-
tiary concern. However, the question of the probative and preju-
dicial value of inferences to be drawn by a jury from a witness'
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege has unique constitu-
tional dimensions which do not come into play when a prosecutor
uses the same tactic.
To the extent that this kind of evidence is offered by a defen-
dant for the purposes of showing the existence of possibilities
other than the defendant's guilt, it is relevant and material to the
defense. Absent a compelling right of constitutional dimensions
residing in the prosecutor that would justify the exclusion of this
admittedly probative evidence, the defendant's sixth amendment
right should control, and the evidence should be allowed. In order
to exclude the evidence the court must, at the very minimum,
find that the potential prejudice to the prosecutorial function
outweighs the defendant's constitutional right to use the evidence
in his defense. This difficult constitutional balancing poses a crit-
ical issue that the Tenth Circuit completely failed to address.
Viewed in this light, the court's result in Martin and Eitel
becomes questionable. Allowing the speculative danger of preju-
dice to the prosecutor to take precedence over a defendant's con-
stitutional right arguably recasts the traditional balance of ad-
vantage in a criminal proceeding. Giving the benefit of any doubt
to the prosecutor arguably tips the scales of justice in a manner
historically considered abhorrent to our system of criminal jus-
tice.
Michael Cook

